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I. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A. MANDAMUS AND OTHER ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS
1. Mandamus Relief Granted
a. Discovery Orders
URING the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court twice
granted mandamus relief to protect trade secrets from disclo-
sure. In the 1998 case of In re Continental General Tire, Inc., the
supreme court established the standard for determining whether trade
secrets are discoverable. 1 A party asserting trade secret privilege has the
burden of proving that the information sought qualifies as a trade secret.
If met, the burden shifts to the party seeking trade secret information to
establish that the information is necessary for a fair adjudication of its
claim. If a trial court orders production once trade secret status is
proven, but the party seeking production has not shown a necessity for
the requested materials, then the trial court's action is an abuse of
discretion. 2
In In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.3 and In re Bass,4 the Texas Supreme
Court determined that the plaintiffs did not show that disclosure of the
trade secret was necessary for a fair adjudication. In re Bridgestone/Fire-
stone involved the allegation that Firestone tire tread separations caused
the failure of the tires and roll-overs in Ford Explorers. Like the plain-
tiffs in Continental General Tire,5 the plaintiffs in Bridgestone sought the
discovery of Firestone's skim stock formulas, which they conceded were
trade secrets before the Texas Supreme Court. The supreme court held
1. In re Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. 1998).
2. Id.
3. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730, 735 (Tex. 2003).
4. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. 2003).
5. In re Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Tex. 1998).
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that the test for determining whether disclosure of the skim stock formu-
las was necessary for a fair adjudication could not be satisfied by general
assertions of unfairness or the possibility of unfairness, and that the plain-
tiffs' evidence of unfairness did not meet that test.6 Accordingly, the trial
court was ordered to vacate its order requiring disclosure of the formulas.
In the case of In re Bass, a group of non-participating royalty interest
owners sought discovery of seismic data, which they claimed was neces-
sary to show that the mineral estate owner breached its fiduciary duty to
develop his land.7 The Texas Supreme Court held that the geological
seismic data was a trade secret, but disclosure was not necessary for a fair
adjudication because the mineral estate owner did not have a duty to
develop or a fiduciary duty.8 Thus, the supreme court held that the trial
court abused its discretion by compelling the mineral estate owner to pro-
duce trade secrets, and no appellate remedy existed.9
In the case of In re CSX Corp.,10 the Texas Supreme Court granted
mandamus relief from a trial court order directing the relators to identify
all safety employees who worked for them for a thirty-year period, even
though the plaintiff never worked for the relators or for their parent com-
pany for that length of time.11 Comparing the discovery request to a
"fishing expedition," the supreme court held that the information sought
was irrelevant, overly broad, and lacked reasonable limitations as to time
and subject matter under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3.12 Moreo-
ver, the court held that no adequate remedy existed by appeal, explaining
that the discovery order imposed a burden on the producing party "far
out of proportion to any benefit that may obtain to the requesting
party. '13
In re Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co.14 involved the
apex deposition of the president and CEO of Burlington Northern and
Santa Fe Railway Company. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals granted
mandamus relief, concluding that the real parties in interest failed to
show that the apex executive had unique or superior knowledge of dis-
coverable information, or that he had information that could not be ob-
tained through less intrusive means. 15
6. Bridgestone, 106 S.W.3d at 732-34. Justice O'Neill wrote a separate concurring
opinion to offer more guidance to the bench and bar on the proper analysis of the necessity
of trade secret information to fair adjudication. Id. at 734-38 (O'Neill, J., concurring).
7. Bass, 113 S.W.3d at 738.
8. Id. at 742-45.
9. Id. at 746.
10. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. 2003).
11. Id. at 152.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. In re Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 99 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2003, orig. proceeding).
15. Id. at 327. That standard was articulated in Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Gar-
cia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1995).
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In the case of In re Hochheim Prairie Farm Mutual Insurance Ass'n,' 6
the supreme court held that the trial court abused its discretion by grant-
ing a petition for pre-suit depositions and production of documents under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202. The court reasoned that the real par-
ties in interest adduced no evidence of imminent loss of the witnesses'
testimony, and the prejudice to the defendant in having to submit its em-
ployees for deposition far outweighed any benefit to the real parties in
interest.17
During the Survey period, mandamus relief was also available where
the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion to exclude an
inadvertently-produced legal memorandum prepared by an attorney out-
lining potential claims in the suit,18 where the trial court ordered an out-
of-state non-party witness to appear for a deposition in Texas, 19 and
where the trial court made a deemed finding of joint and several liability
as a discovery sanction. 20
b. Order Interfering with a Board of Disciplinary Appeals
Judgment
In the case of In re State Bar of Texas, the Texas Supreme Court held
that the district court abused its discretion by interfering with a finally
adjudicated Board of Disciplinary Appeals (BODA) judgment.2' The
State Bar Act gives the Texas Supreme Court administrative power to
regulate the practice of law, which it has delegated to BODA.2 2 In State
Bar, BODA suspended an attorney from practicing law after the supreme
court affirmed the attorney's suspension order. However, the suspended
attorney appealed the suspension to the trial court, asserting that the
court had jurisdiction because of its enforcement power over BODA
judgments. The trial court declared the BODA judgment void based on
the suspended attorney's argument that a BODA panel member who
heard the case should have been disqualified. 23 BODA sought manda-
mus relief.
16. In re Hochheim Prairie Farm Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 115 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 2003, orig. proceeding).
17. Id.
18. In re AEP Tex. Centr. Co., No. 04-03-00253-CV, 2003 WL 21658540, at *6 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio July 16, 2003, orig. proceeding).
19. In re W. Star Trucks US, Inc., 112 S.W.3d 756, 764-65 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003,
orig. proceeding).
20. Id. at 765-66.
21. In re State Bar of Tex., 113 S.W.3d 730, 733-34 (Tex. 2003). Ordinarily, a relator
must first seek mandamus relief in the court of appeals. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.
§§ 22.220(a)-22.221. Here, BODA was excused from bypassing the court of appeals be-
cause it presented an issue of statewide importance. State Bar, 113 S.W.3d at 732-33. Thus,
the supreme court opted to exercise jurisdiction over BODA's mandamus petition. Id. at
733.
22. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 81.011(c) (Vernon 1998); State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez,
891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994).
23. State Bar, 113 S.W.3d at 732.
2004]
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The supreme court stated that it had "consistently granted mandamus
relief when a lower court interferes with the disciplinary process," but
that it had "never considered whether a district court's interference with
a finally adjudicated BODA disciplinary judgment constitutes an abuse of
discretion. '24 The court concluded that Texas Rule of Disciplinary Proce-
dure 2.20, which provides that such a BODA order cannot be superseded
or stayed, was dispositive.25 Therefore, the district court abused its dis-
cretion in voiding the BODA judgment.26
c. Order Refusing to Dismiss Out-of-State Asbestos Claims
Section 71.052 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code gener-
ally provides for the dismissal of asbestos claims in which (1) the plaintiff
was not a Texas resident when the claim arose; and (2) the claim arose
outside of Texas; and (3) the claim was commenced in a Texas court after
August 1, 1995 but before January 1, 1997.27 In the case of In re E.L du
Pont de Nemours and Co.,28 8,000 plaintiffs sued eighty defendants for
damages to exposure to asbestos based on claims that commenced before
August 1, 1995. Relator was added by amended pleadings on September
10, 1996. Relator moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against it under
Section 71.052, arguing that (1) most plaintiffs had no contact with Texas;
and (2) the claims against it were commenced within the August 1, 1995 -
January 1, 1997 timeframe because it was not named in the litigation until
September 10, 1996. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that the
statute did not apply because the claims against relator related back to
their lawsuits against the other defendants filed before August 1, 1995.29
The trial court denied relator's motion to dismiss, and the court of ap-
peals denied mandamus relief. The Texas Supreme Court granted man-
damus relief, concluding, based in part on the court's construction of the
statute, that plaintiffs' claims against relator did not relate back.
Plaintiffs also argued that Section 71.052 rulings are not reviewable by
mandamus because the legislature provided for an interlocutory appeal
from the denial of a special appearance in the same session in which it
enacted Section 71.052.30 The supreme court rejected that argument,
stating that "the inference is not one we can logically draw."' 31 "It is just
as reasonable to infer that the legislature intended that orders under Sec-
tion 71.052 be subject to the same rules regarding mandamus review as
any other interlocutory orders. '32
24. Id. at 733.
25. Id. (citing TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.20).
26. Id. at 734.
27. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.052 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (repealed 2003).
28. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 92 S.W.3d 517, 519 (Tex. 2002).
29. Id. at 521-22.
30. Id. Before seeking mandamus relief, relator had filed a special appearance, which
the trial court denied, and which was affirmed on interlocutory appeal. Id. at 521.
31. Id. at 524.
32. Id.
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d. Order Refusing to Enforce an Unsuperseded Judgment
A party is entitled to mandamus relief to vacate an order that improp-
erly denies a prevailing party's attempt to enforce an unsuperseded judg-
ment.33 In In re Crow-Billingsley Air Park, Ltd., the Texas Supreme
Court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to
hear a motion to enforce an unsuperseded final judgment. Instead, it dis-
missed relator's enforcement motion for want of jurisdiction.34
e. Arbitration Orders
Mandamus is the appropriate method by which to challenge a trial
court's ruling on a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (FAA).35 When a trial court abuses its discretion by denying
a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, the movant has no ade-
quate remedy at law and is entitled to mandamus relief.36 Moreover,
mandamus relief is available when a trial court improperly enforces an
arbitration agreement against non-signatories to the agreement,37 and
when a trial court improperly includes findings of fact on the merits in an
order compelling arbitration.38
f. Void Orders
"Mandamus will issue to correct a void order of a trial court. '39 If an
order challenged by writ of mandamus is void, the relator need not show
it does not have an adequate remedy by appeal.40
For example, mandamus will issue to set aside an order for new trial
that is granted after the court's plenary power expires and is, therefore,
void. 41 Mandamus will also issue to set aside an amended scheduling or-
der purporting to rule that a previous scheduling order was actually an
33. In re Crow-Billingsley Air Park, Ltd., 98 S.W.3d 178, 179 (Tex. 2003) (orig.
proceeding).
34. Id. at 179-80.
35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding). If the Texas General Arbitration Act
(TAA) applies, the order is reviewable by interlocutory appeal. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 171.098(a) (Vernon 1997). In MacGregor, 126 S.W.3d 176, 181 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding), the court refused to decide whether parties must file
dual proceedings when it is not clear whether the FAA or the TAA applies, stating that it
was not the proper forum to determine the issue.
36. In re Media Arts Group, Inc., 116 S.W.3d 900, 904 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding); In re Neutral Posture, Inc., No. 01-02-00447-CV, 2003 WL
21756427, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 31, 2003, orig. proceeding); In re
Whitfield, 115 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, orig. proceeding); In re Scott,
100 S.W.3d 575, 582 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, orig. proceeding).
37. In re Hartigan, 107 S.W.3d 684, 691-92 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, orig.
proceeding).
38. In re H20 Plumbing, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 79, 81 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, orig.
proceeding).
39. In re Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d 36, 39 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, orig. proceed-
ing) (citing Urbish v. 127th Judicial Dist. Ct., 708 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1986)).
40. Id.
41. In re Parker, 117 S.W.3d 484, 486 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, orig. proceeding).
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order granting a motion for new trial, as the trial court's order was void.42
Moreover, when a judge "continues to sit in violation of a constitu-
tional proscription," mandamus is available to compel the judge's
mandatory disqualification without showing that the relator lacks an ade-
quate appellate remedy.4 3 In re Gonzalez involved the issue of whether a
constitutional county judge disqualified from serving on the case under
Article V, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution continued "to sit in viola-
tion of a constitutional proscription" when he signed (1) an order ap-
pointing a visiting judge to try the case; and (2) an order transferring the
case from county court to district court after the case had already been
tried by the appointed visiting judge.44 The San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals held that the order appointing the visiting judge was not void for
lack of jurisdiction because the order was a ministerial act confirming a
selection made by the parties as authorized by the Texas Constitution. 45
Accordingly, mandamus relief was denied on that point. However, be-
cause the order of transfer involved the exercise of judicial discretion, the
disqualified trial judge had no authority to sign the order.4 6 Accordingly,
mandamus relief was available to compel the disqualified trial judge to
vacate his transfer order.47
g. Order Disposing of a Foreign Judgment
In a suit to enforce a foreign judgment, a court can grant only two types
of relief: (1) enforce the judgment; or (2) declare the judgment void for
want of jurisdiction.48 In the case of In re Jackson Person & Associates,
Inc., the trial court purported to grant a new trial setting aside a Tennes-
see default judgment.4 9 Because the trial court did not have the discre-
tion to grant a new trial and place the parties back where they were
before the trial in the foreign jurisdiction, mandamus relief was
available. 50
2. Mandamus Relief Denied
a. Discovery Orders
Where a trial court's order requiring the production of databases for
examination contemplated a possible future order detailing the search
methodology, but no search methodology had been ordered, the Texas
Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus as premature.
42. In re Nguyen, No. 12-03-00162-CV, 2003 WL 21402503, at *2 (Tex. App.-Tyler
June 18, 2003, orig. proceeding).
43. Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d at 39 (quoting In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427,
428 (Tex. 1998)).
44. Id. at 38; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11.
45. Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d at 40-41 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. V, § 16).
46. Id. at 41-42.
47. Id. at 42.
48. In re Jackson Person & Assocs., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 815, 816 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2003, orig. proceeding).
49. Id. at 817.
50. Id.
Vol. 57
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The Eastland Court of Appeals denied relators' request for mandamus
protection from producing net worth information in In re Western Star
Trucks, Inc. 51 In that case, relators relied on the dissenting opinion in In
re Jerry's Chevrolet-Buick, Inc.,52 in which Justice Raul Gonzalez argued
that a plaintiff should be required to make a prima facie showing that
exemplary damages are appropriate before obtaining discovery of net
worth information.53 Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Lunsford v. Morris, the Eastland Court of Appeals rejected relators' ar-
gument and held that "there is no evidentiary threshold a litigant must
cross before seeking discovery."'54 Accordingly, plaintiff's allegations that
defendants/relators had engaged in fraudulent and malicious conduct
were sufficient to permit the plaintiff to obtain discovery of the defend-
ants' net worth, and mandamus relief was not available. 55
b. Orders Involving Emergency Relief
Mandamus is generally available to stay a trial court's extension of a
fourteen-day temporary restraining order (TRO).56 In the case of In re
Walkup, however, the court decided that the fourteen-day maximum
length for a TRO was fourteen calendar days, not fourteen twenty-four-
hour periods. 57 Counting fourteen calendar days, the TRO in Walkup
was in effect when the trial court granted the extension, and therefore,
there was no abuse of discretion. 58
c. Orders Compelling Arbitration
As discussed above, mandamus is often available to obtain relief from
a trial court's ruling on a motion to compel arbitration. 59 However, in
two cases decided this Survey period, the courts found no abuse of
discretion.
In re Hartigan60 involved an arbitration agreement between an attor-
ney and his client. The client argued, among other things, that the arbi-
tration provision was unenforceable because it prospectively limited the
lawyer's liability for malpractice in violation of Rule 1.08(g) of the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and that the arbitration provi-
sion failed to meet the requirements of Section 171.002 of the Texas Civil
51. In re W. Star Trucks US, Inc., 112 S.W.3d 756, 764 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003,
orig. proceeding).
52. In re Jerry's Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1998).
53. Star Trucks, 112 S.W.3d at 764 (relying on Jerry's Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 977 S.W.2d
at 565).
54. Id. (quoting Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988)).
55. Id.
56. In re Walkup, 122 S.W.3d 215, 215-16 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, orig.
proceeding).
57. Id. at 218.
58. Id.
59. See supra Part I.A.l.e and note 34.




Practice and Remedies Code, which applies to claims for personal in-
jury.61 The court of appeals rejected each argument, holding that there
was no violation of the disciplinary rule and that a malpractice claim is
not a claim for personal injury excluded from the scope of the Texas Ar-
bitration Act by Section 171.002(a). 62 Finding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by compelling arbitration between the client and her
attorney, the court of appeals denied mandamus relief.63
In re Bustamante64 involved the challenge of an order directing an em-
ployee to arbitrate her negligence claims against her employer. The em-
ployee sought mandamus relief, arguing that the arbitration agreement
was illusory because her employer retained the right to unilaterally
amend the agreement at any time.65 However, based on the record
presented to the court of appeals, the court found that the arbitration
agreement properly required mutual consent to modify.66 Thus, the trial
court did not clearly abuse its discretion by ordering relator to
arbitration.
d. Orders of Severance
The Amarillo Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief in In re Occi-
dental Permian Ltd.,67 an oil and gas case involving the severance of Occi-
dental's counterclaim from the remaining claims in the suit. Under Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 41, any claim against a party may be severed and
pursued separately.68 It makes no difference that the severed claim is a
compulsory counterclaim. "[A]s long as the trial court abides by Rule 41,
it is not error to sever and proceed separately with any claim, including a
compulsory counterclaim. '69 Moreover, a claim is severable if (1) the
suit involves more than one cause of action; (2) the severed claim is one
that could be prosecuted through a separate lawsuit; and (3) it is not so
interwoven with the remaining action that they involve the same facts and
issues.70 Because the record demonstrated that those three elements
61. Id. at 689-90.
62. Id. In so holding, the court expressly disagreed with contrary decisions by the
Beaumont and Corpus Christi Courts of Appeals holding that Texas classifies legal mal-
practice claims as personal injury claims for all purposes. Id. at 690; cf. In re Godt, 28
S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding); Sample v. Freeman,
873 S.W.2d 470, 476 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied); Estate of Degley v. Vega,
797 S.W.2d 299, 302-03 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
63. Hartigan, 107 S.W.3d at 692. However, the court granted mandamus relief in part,
concluding that the trial court could not compel two of the client's former attorneys to
arbitration because they were not parties to the arbitration agreement.
64. In re Bustamante, 104 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, orig.
proceeding).
65. Id. at 706.
66. Id.
67. In re Occidental Permian Ltd., No. 07-03-0016-CV, 2003 WL 1799012, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo Apr. 7, 2003, orig. proceeding).
68. TEX. R. Civ. P. 41.
69. Occidental Permian, 2003 WL 1799012, at *2.
70. Id. (citing Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658
(Tex. 1990)).
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were met, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a sever-
ance and mandamus was denied.71
e. Refusal to Rule on Summary Judgment Motion
As a general rule, appellate courts have the power to compel a trial
judge to rule on pending motions when it is shown that the trial judge has
a clear legal duty to act and has refused to do so. 72 In re American Media
Consolidated73 involved the trial court's failure to rule on a motion for
summary judgment filed more than two years after the underlying lawsuit
was filed and less than one month before the scheduled trial date. The
court held that to be entitled to mandamus relief, relator was required to
show that the trial court's express purpose in refusing to rule was to pre-
clude relator from perfecting a statutory interlocutory appeal.74 Because
relator did not meet that burden, the petition for writ of mandamus was
denied.75
f. Order Refusing to Stay Probate Proceedings
In the case of In re Shore,76 the relator sought to stop the trial court's
efforts to finalize probate proceedings based on the pendency of his ap-
peal from the trial court's earlier declaratory judgment on the invalidity
of part of the deceased's will. The controlling statute, Texas Probate
Code Section 29, provided that "[w]hen an appeal is taken by an execu-
tor..., no bond shall be required, unless such appeal personally concerns
him, in which case he must give the bond." Relator, who served as both
the executor and devisee under the will, did not file a bond, arguing that
Section 29 excused him from such a requirement because he served as the
executor of the estate. 77 The San Antonio Court of Appeals rejected re-
lator's argument, holding instead that relator had a personal interest in
what will provisions applied and was required to file a supersedeas bond
to prevent execution of the judgment.78 Finding that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to stay proceedings, mandamus was
denied.
71. Id. at *3.
72. In re Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 990 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1999, orig. proceeding); Zalta v. Tennant, 789 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding).
73. In re Am. Media Consol., 121 S.W.3d 70, 72 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, orig.
proceeding).
74. Id. at 73 (citing Grant v. Wood, 916 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1995, orig. proceeding)).
75. Id. The summary judgment motion in this defamation case was filed by a media
defendant, so interlocutory appeal would have been available from the denial of the defen-
dant's summary judgment. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 51.014 (Vernon Supp.
2004).
76. In re Shore, 106 S.W.3d 817, 818 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, orig. proceeding).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 820-21.
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3. Adequate Remedy by Appeal
"That a party must have 'no other adequate remedy by law' is a 'funda-
mental tenet' of mandamus practice. ' 79 Ordinarily, incidental district
court rulings will not be reviewed by mandamus because an adequate
appellate remedy exists.80 An appellate remedy is not inadequate merely
because it involves more expense or delay than a writ of mandamus. 81
Rather, the relator must establish the effective denial of a reasonable op-
portunity to develop the merits of his or her case, so that the trial would
be a waste of judicial resources.82
An exception to these general rules arises when one court renders an
order that directly interferes with another court's jurisdiction or fails to
observe a mandatory statutory provision conferring a right.83 In such in-
stances, there is no adequate appellate remedy.
Moreover, in most instances an appeal is an adequate remedy for the
improper denial of a special appearance.84 However, that is not so in
"mass tort litigation [which] places significant strain on a defendant's re-
sources and creates considerable pressure to settle the case, regardless of
the underlying merits." 85
A party generally lacks an adequate remedy by appeal in a number of
instances, including the denial or grant of a motion to compel arbitra-
tion, 86 a motion seeking the disqualification of an attorney or a law
79. In re State Bar of Tex., 113 S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Walker v. Packer,
827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992)).
80. Id.; Galtex Prop. Investors, Inc. v. City of Galveston, 113 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (challenge to contempt judgment ade-
quately remedied by appeal); In re Aaron, No. 07-03-0324-CV, 2003 WL 21919346, *2 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo Aug. 12, 2003, orig. proceeding) ("Mandamus is not an available remedy
for monetary sanctions imposed during post-judgment proceedings such as these because
review is available by appeal when the sanctions become part of a final judgment on which
execution is authorized."); In re Pena, 104 S.W.3d 719 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, orig. pro-
ceeding) (appeal is an adequate remedy for trial court's refusal to rule on a motion for new
trial or the overruling of such a motion by operation of law); In re W. Star Trucks US, Inc.,
112 S.W.3d 756, 763 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, orig. proceeding) ("[A] trial court's deci-
sion to permit an amended pleading is not particularly amenable to review by
mandamus.").
81. In re Smart, 103 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding)
(Although trial court abused its discretion by granting legislative continuance, the matter
was comparable to an ordinary continuance; such delay can be remedied on appeal.).
82. In re Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 106 S.W.3d 332, 333-34 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, orig. proceeding) (finding that relators did not meet their burden of proving that the
trial court's order requiring them to pay an $8 million bond would preclude them from
developing the merits of their case or that they were in danger of permanently losing sub-
stantial rights).
83. Id. (stating that the district court order interfered with BODA's continuing juris-
diction over attorney's suspension); In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., 107 S.W.3d 832, 844(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (stating that the district court
interfered with the exclusive jurisdiction of the county court).
84. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 92 S.W.3d 517, 524 (Tex. 2002).
85. Id. (quoting CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996)).
86. In re Media Arts Group, Inc., 116 S.W.3d 900, 904 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding); In re Neutral Posture, Inc., No. 01-02-00447-CV, 2003 WL
21756427, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 31, 2003).
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firm,87 certain discovery orders,88 and an order compelling a case to arbi-
tration that also includes findings of facts on the merits. 89
4. Diligence in Seeking Mandamus Relief
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is largely governed by equi-
table principles.90 Thus, Texas courts often deny mandamus relief due to
a party's lack of diligence in asserting its rights.91 In determining whether
a relator's delay in seeking a writ of mandamus is a barrier to the issuance
of the writ, a court may analogize to the doctrine of laches, which re-
quires a showing of (1) an unreasonable delay; and (2) harm resulting
because of the delay.92
A party may file an affidavit providing a reasonable explanation for the
delay.93 A delay will be excused upon a showing that the relator was
waiting for the preparation of the reporter's record and a ruling on a
related motion, and where the real party in interest had requested a brief
moratorium of activity in the case after her father passed away. 94
5. Mandamus Jurisdiction
In the case of In re Hettler,95 the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that it
did not have jurisdiction to consider a petition for mandamus against a
district court judge acting in his capacity as regional presiding judge. Sec-
tion 22.221 of the Texas Government Code authorizes a court of appeals
to issue a writ of mandamus where relief is sought against a judge of a
district or county court in the court of appeals's district or a judge of a
district court who is acting as a magistrate at a court of inquiry under
Chapter 52, Code of Criminal Procedure, in the court of appeals's dis-
87. In re Skiles, 102 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, orig. proceeding)
(quoting Nat'l Med. Enter., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 133 (Tex. 1996) (A party "is
not required to simply hope that the pending case is concluded without disclosure of its
confidences," nor is a party "required to wait until any damage will have been done and
will be irremediable.")).
88. In re Hinterlong, 109 S.W.3d 611,621 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, orig. proceed-
ing) ("Remedy by appeal in a discovery mandamus is not adequate where a party is re-
quired 'to try his lawsuit, debilitated by the denial of proper discovery, only to have that
lawsuit rendered a nullity on appeal.' Remedy by appeal is likewise not adequate where
the trial court's discovery order disallows discovery that cannot be made a part of the
appellate record, thereby denying the reviewing court the ability to evaluate the effect of
the trial court's error.").
89. In re H20 Plumbing, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 36, 81 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, orig.
proceeding).
90. Galtex Prop. Investors, Inc. v. City of Galveston, 113 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding).
91. Id. (fourteen-month delay).
92. Hinterlong, 109 S.W.3d at 620; AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190,
202 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (eight-month delay did not
prevent mandamus relief where the real party in interest does not assert prejudice caused
by the delay).
93. Hinterlong, 109 S.W.3d at 620.
94. Id.
95. In re Hettler, 110 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding).
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trict.96 In Hettler, a district judge was assigned to hear relators' motion
for disqualification. 97 Although the assigned judge was a district judge
sitting in the court of appeals's district (over whom the court of appeals
would ordinarily have mandamus jurisdiction), relators sought relief
against that judge in his capacity as the presiding judge of an administra-
tive judicial region. 98 Because the legislature did not give courts of ap-
peals the specific power to issue writs of mandamus against district judges
acting in the capacity of a regional presiding judge, the court held that it
had no mandamus jurisdiction and dismissed the case.99
In re Meridien Hotels,. Inc.100 involved the mandamus jurisdiction of
county courts at law. The Texas Constitution provides that "[t]he
[c]ounty [c]ourt has jurisdiction as provided by law. . . [c]ounty court
judges shall have the power to issue writs necessary to enforce their juris-
diction."''1 1 Section 25.0004(a) of the Texas Government Code provides
that "[a] statutory county court or its judge may issue writs of injunction,
mandamus, sequestration, attachment, garnishment, certiorari, superse-
deas, and all writs necessary for the enforcement of the jurisdiction of the
court."'1 02 The relator in Meridien took the position that a county court's
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus was limited to writs necessary to
enforce the county court's jurisdiction.10 3 The Dallas Court of Appeals
disagreed, reasoning that the constitution and statute provided two grants
of authority to issue writs:
(1) the specifically named writs when the petition for the writ pleads
an amount in controversy within the county court's limited jurisdic-
tion; and
(2) all writs necessary to the enforcement of the county court's juris-
diction, regardless of the amount in controversy. 104
Therefore, Dallas County Court at Law No. 2 had jurisdiction to issue a
writ of mandamus compelling a justice court to vacate its order of abate-
ment of a forcible entry and detainer action, to begin trial by a certain
date, and to render a decision within a reasonable time.10 5
96. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.221(b)(1)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
97. Hettler, 110 S.W.3d at 153.
98. Id. at 154.
99. Id. at 154-55.
100. Meridien Hotels, Inc. v. LHO Fin. P'ship, 97 S.W.3d 731, 736-37 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las 2003, orig. proceeding).
101. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 16.
102. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 25.0004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
103. Meridien Hotels, 97 S.W.3d at 736.
104. Id. Unlike other Texas county courts, Dallas County's county courts at law have
expanded amount-in-controversy jurisdiction concurrent with the district court in civil
cases. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 25.0592(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
105. Meridien Hotels, 97 S.W.3d at 737.
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B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
1. Interlocutory Appeals in the Courts of Appeals
a. Orders Subject to Interlocutory Appeal
i. Orders Relating to Arbitration
"Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of
interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdic-
tion.' 10 6 Because "a statute authorizing an appeal from an interlocutory
order is 'in derogation' of the general rule that only final judgments are
appealable ... Texas courts strictly construe those statutes authorizing
interlocutory appeals.' 10 7
Applying these principles, the First District Court of Appeals in Walker
Sand, Inc. v. Baytown Asphalt Materials, Ltd. dismissed an appeal for lack
of jurisdiction because the interlocutory order appealed did not fall into
any statutory provision permitting an interlocutory appeal. Section
171.098(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code permits an
interlocutory appeal from the denial of an application to compel arbitra-
tion made pursuant to Section 171.021.108 In Walker Sand, the defendant
appealed the trial court's order denying his motion requesting a stay and
abatement of proceedings "to permit arbitration." Dismissing the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, the court of appeals noted that neither Section
171.098 nor any other statute provides for an interlocutory appeal of an
order denying a motion to stay or to abate the trial court's proceedings.
The court specifically concluded that the order did not deny "an applica-
tion to compel arbitration" as contemplated by Section 171.098(a)(1) be-
cause it neither actually nor effectively stayed or prevented arbitration.10 9
ii. Orders Relating to Injunctive Relief
Under Section 51.014(a)(4) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code, an interlocutory appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order
that "grants or refuses a temporary injunction or grants or overrules a
motion to dissolve a temporary injunction as provided by Chapter 65 [of
the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code]." 110 During the Survey pe-
riod, the First District Court of Appeals in Ahmed v. Shimi Ventures, L.P.
analyzed whether an interlocutory order modifying a temporary injunc-
tion is subject to interlocutory appeal."1 Acknowledging the strict con-
struction required for statutes granting interlocutory jurisdiction, and
further recognizing that an order modifying a temporary injunction is
"not exactly" one of the orders listed in Section 51.014(a)(4), the court of
106. Walker Sand, Inc. v. Baytown Asphalt Materials, Ltd., 95 S.W.3d 511, 514 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 514.
108. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
109. Walker Sand, 95 S.W.3d at 515-16.
110. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.014(a)(4), 65.001-.045 (Vernon 1997 &
Supp. 2004).
111. Ahmed v. Shimi Ventures, L.P., 99 S.W.3d 682, 688-89 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
2004]
SMU LAW REVIEW
appeals nonetheless found that it had jurisdiction over the order modify-
ing the temporary injunction "given the similarity" of the order to the
orders expressly listed in the statute.112
In contrast, the Dallas Court of Appeals in Art Institute v. Integral
Hedging, L.P. strictly construed the statute allowing an interlocutory ap-
peal from an order granting or refusing a temporary injunction, and con-
cluded that it "cannot be used as a vehicle for carrying other non-
appealable interlocutory orders to the appellate court."'113 The court, ac-
cordingly, refused to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal from an order
directing a receiver to sell assets and pay from a fund a certain sum in
attorney's fees to the appellees' attorneys because the order neither ap-
pointed a receiver or overruled a motion to vacate a receiver, nor denied
a request for a temporary injunction against payment of attorney's fees
from the assets of the fund.114
iii. Orders Relating to Class Certification
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court and the Austin
Court of Appeals1 15 confirmed that, although the standard of review for
class certification decisions is abuse of discretion, the court of appeals's
discretion is narrowed by the "rigorous analysis" rule of Southwestern Re-
fining Co. v. Bernal. In Bernal, the supreme court held that "[c]ourts
must perform a 'rigorous analysis' before ruling on class certification to
determine whether all prerequisites to certification have been met . . .
[because] actual, not presumed, conformance with [the requirements of
Rule 42] remains . . . indispensable."' 16
iv. Orders Relating to Immunity of a Government Official
An order that denies a motion for summary judgment based on an as-
sertion of immunity by a person who is an officer or employee of the state
or a political subdivision of the state is an appealable interlocutory or-
der.' 17 Because the waiver of sovereign immunity found in the Texas
Tort Claims Act (the "Act") is based on respondeat superior, the Texas
Supreme Court has held that a governmental entity cannot be held liable
under the Act if its individual officer would be entitled to immunity. 118
Under this rule, a governmental entity may use an employee's official
immunity defense as a basis for interlocutory appeal in a case arising
under the Act." 19
112. Id. at 689.
113. Art Inst. v. Integral Hedging, L.P., No. 05-02-01314-CV, 2003 WL 21715885, at *5
(Tex. App.-Dallas July 25, 2003, no pet.).
114. Id. at *4.
115. Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Hankins, 111 S.W.3d 69, 71 (Tex. 2003); Ford Mo-
tor Co. v. Sheldon, 113 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
116. S.W. Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000).
117. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
118. DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 652 (Tex. 1995).
119. City of Beverly Hills v. Guevara, 904 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. 1995). See City of
Houston v. Flaniken, 108 S.W.3d 555, 556 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)
(permitting City of Houston to pursue interlocutory appeal based on official immunity
claim of employee).
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v. Orders Relating to Joinder
An order granting or denying the joinder or intervention of a plaintiff
who could not otherwise maintain proper venue is an appealable interloc-
utory order. 120 However, in actions filed before September 1, 2003, only
a person seeking or opposing intervention or joinder is permitted to pur-
sue an interlocutory appeal of the order. A party whose rights are not
affected by the intervention or joinder order has no standing to seek an
interlocutory appeal from the order. 121
vi. Orders on Plea to the Jurisdiction
An order that grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a govern-
mental unit is appealable.' 22 There is a split of authority as to whether
individual officers may file pleas to the jurisdiction and file an interlocu-
tory appeal. Because an official capacity suit is essentially a suit against
the government, some Texas appellate courts hold that governmental of-
ficials acting in their official capacity are "governmental units.' 2 3 Other
courts hold that individual officials are not "governmental units" under
the statute granting the right to appeal. 2 4
b. Scope of Review on Interlocutory Appeal
While an interlocutory appeal is pending before it, a court of appeals
has jurisdiction, under Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.6, to review "a
further appealable order concerning the same subject matter.' 25 During
the Survey period, the First District Court of Appeals utilized this rule to
review a modified temporary injunction order that was independently ap-
pealable and concerned the same subject matter as an earlier temporary
injunction order already pending on interlocutory appeal. 126 In another
case, the court further reviewed a modified trial court's order deciding
the propriety of a party's joinder, which the trial court had entered to
correct an earlier order that had already been appealed. a27 In consider-
ing the modified order, the court of appeals cited to Rule of Appellate
Procedure 27.3, which requires the court of appeals in such circumstances
120. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
121. Ramirez v. Collier, Shannon, Scott, PLLC, 123 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
122. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
123. Potter County Attorney's Office v. Stars & Stripes Sweepstakes, L.L.C., 121
S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet. h.); Ware v. Miller, 82 S.W.3d 795, 800
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. denied); Friona Indep. Sch. Dist. v. King, 15 S.W.3d 653,
657 n.3 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.); Perry v. Del Rio, 53 S.W.3d 818, 821-22 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2001), pet. dism'd, 66 S.W.3d 239, 264 (Tex. 2001).
124. Castleberry Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 35 S.W.3d 777, 780 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.); Univ. of Houston v. Elthon, 9 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j.); Johnson v. Resendez, 993 S.W.2d 723, 728 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1999), appeal dism'd, 52 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. 2001).
125. TEX. R. App. P. 29.6(a)(1).
126. Ahmed v. Shimi Ventures, L.P., 99 S.W.3d 682, 688-89 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
127. Ramirez v. Collier, Shannon, Scott, PLLC, 123 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
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to treat the pending appeal "as from the subsequent order." 128
In an interlocutory appeal based on a trial court's denial of a motion
for summary judgment by a state official or employee asserting immunity,
the court of appeals may review only the trial court's ruling on the immu-
nity defense-the court may not consider other defenses raised by the
motion for summary judgment. 129
c. Trial Court Proceedings Pending Interlocutory Appeal
In cases filed prior to September 1, 2003, the filing of an interlocutory
appeal from an order certifying a class action operates to stay the com-
mencement of a trial in the trial court pending resolution of the appeal.1 30
As the parties learned in Lincoln Property Co. v. Kondos, however, this
stay can be waived, which, if the case proceeds far enough, can moot the
interlocutory appeal.13 1
In Lincoln Property, the trial court certified the class and the defendant
filed an interlocutory appeal from the class certification order. Before
the appeal was argued, however, both parties moved for summary judg-
ment, which the trial court granted in favor of the defendant. Ultimately,
the trial court signed a final judgment, which the plaintiff separately
appealed. 132
Questioning its jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal, the court of
appeals noted that, because the interlocutory class certification order
merged into the final judgment and the trial court's plenary jurisdiction
thereafter expired, the trial court had rendered itself powerless to recon-
sider its class certification ruling, even if the court of appeals remanded
the order in the interlocutory appeal. This meant that the court of ap-
peals's decision in the interlocutory appeal would not affect the rights of
the parties. The court of appeals accordingly concluded that, by signing a
final judgment, the trial court rendered the interlocutory appeal of the
class certification order moot, requiring a dismissal of the appeal for want
of jurisdiction.133
2. Supreme Court Jurisdiction Over Interlocutory Appeals
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court readily accepted
jurisdiction over several interlocutory appeals involving the issue of
waiver of sovereign immunity in suits involving public mental health facil-
ities. 134 The waiver issue had previously been resolved in a series of opin-
128. TEX. R. App. P. 27.3.
129. City of Houston v. Flaniken, 108 S.W.3d 555, 556 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
130. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
131. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Kondos, 110 S.W.3d 712, 713-14 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no
pet.).
132. Id. at 714-15.
133. Id. at 715-16.
134. Beaumont State Ctr. v. Kozlowski, 108 S.W.3d 899, 899-900 (Tex. 2003); Dallas
Metrocare Servs. v. Pratt, 124 S.W.3d 147, 148-49 (Tex. 2003).
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ions, 135 and the supreme court had no difficulty accepting jurisdiction
where the holdings in the prior cases were dispositive. 136
The Texas Supreme Court further continued its trend of approaching
the "conflicts" jurisdictional analysis from a functional rather than techni-
cal perspective. For example, the supreme court found jurisdiction over
an interlocutory order certifying a class in Union Pacific Resources
Group, Inc. v. Hankins137 based on the court of appeals's failure to en-
force the supreme court's requirement pronounced in Southwestern Re-
fining Co. v. Bernal that the trial court consider the substantive law
involved in the case in determining whether the purported class can meet
the certification prerequisites under Rule 42.138
3. Impact of House Bill 4 on Interlocutory Appeals
House Bill 4 has impacted interlocutory appeals in a number of impor-
tant respects. In House Bill 4, the legislature enacted Section 74.351(b)
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which requires a plaintiff
in a healthcare liability case to serve an expert report on the defendant no
later than 120 days after the date the suit is filed, or suffer dismissal of the
case with a possible award of attorney's fees to the defendant.1 39 Chapter
51 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code now affords the defendant an
immediate appeal of any order denying him all or part of the relief sought
pursuant to the provisions of Section 74.351(b).140
The legislature also enacted Section 74.351(1) of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, which addresses the standard for granting a defendant's
motion challenging the adequacy of an expert report in a healthcare lia-
bility suit.141 An interlocutory order granting such a motion is also imme-
diately appealable under Chapter 51 of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code.142
House Bill 4 further added venue orders to the types of interlocutory
orders subject to immediate appeal. Specifically, before House Bill 4,
Section 15.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code was only a join-
der statute and not a venue statute. Now, under new Section 15.003, a
ruling that a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue
is immediately appealable, in addition to any joinder decision made by
the trial court. 143 Additionally, any party affected by the trial court's de-
135. Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 695-96 (Tex. 2003); Tex. Dep't
of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Lee, 38 S.W.3d 862, 869-70 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2001, pet. denied); Tex. Dep't of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Kelley,
No. 11-01-00258-CV, 2003 WL 1391310 (Tex. App.-Eastland March 20, 2003, no pet.).
136. Beaumont, 108 S.W.3d at 899-900; Dallas Metrocare, 124 S.W.3d at 148-49.
137. Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Harkins, 111 S.W.3d 69, 72 (Tex. 2003).
138. S.W. Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000).
139. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
140. Id. § 51.014(a)(9).
141. Id. § 74.351(1).
142. Id. § 51.014(a)(10).
143. Id. § 15.003(b).
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termination may pursue an interlocutory appeal.144
House Bill 4 also impacted the Texas Supreme Court's jurisdiction over
interlocutory appeals. After House Bill 4, the supreme court has jurisdic-
tion-without the need for a dissent or a conflict-over interlocutory or-
ders denying a motion for summary judgment by a media defendant
based on the free speech/free press provisions of the United States and
Texas Constitutions, as well as over interlocutory orders certifying or re-
fusing to certify a class. 145
House Bill 4 also sets a new standard for determining whether the su-
preme court has "conflicts" jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal.
Before House Bill 4, the Texas Supreme Court had "conflicts" jurisdic-
tion (the court of appeals' opinion conflicts with a prior decision of the
supreme court or another court of appeals) only when the "rulings in the
two cases are so far upon the same state of facts that the decision of one
case is necessarily conclusive of the decision in the other. 1 46 Under the
new standard, one court holds differently from another "when there is
inconsistency in their respective decisions that should be clarified to re-
move unnecessary uncertainty in the law and unfairness to litigants. ' 147
4. Stay of Proceedings Pending Interlocutory Appeal
After House Bill 4, stays of proceedings in the trial court pending inter-
locutory appeal are as follows:
No stay:
* Order granting or refusing a temporary injunction or granting or
overruling a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction.148
* Agreed interlocutory appeals (unless the parties agree and the trial
court, court of appeals, or judge of the court of appeals orders a
stay). 149
Stay of commencement of trial pending resolution of appeal, if the mo-
tion upon which the interlocutory order is based is filed within the time
limits specified in Section 51.014(c) of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code:
* Order granting or denying special appearance. 150
Stay of ALL proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of ap-
peal, if the motion upon which the interlocutory order is based is filed
within the time limits specified in Section 51.014(c) of the Civil Practice
and Remedies Code:
* Order denying a motion for summary judgment based on an asser-
tion of immunity by an officer or employee of the state or political
144. Id. § 15.003(c).
145. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(d) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
146. Gross v. Innes, 988 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex. 1998).
147. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(e) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
148. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 51.014(a)(7).
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subdivision. 151
* Order granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction by a govern-
mental unit.152
Stay of commencement of trial pending resolution of appeal, regardless
of when the motion upon which the interlocutory order is based is filed:
* Order appointing a receiver or trustee.153
* Order overruling a motion to vacate an order appointing a receiver
or trustee.
154
" Order denying a motion for summary judgment brought by a media
defendant based on the free speech/free press clauses of Texas and
United States Constitutions.155
* Order denying a motion to dismiss and/or for fees in a healthcare
liability case.156
* Order granting a challenge to an expert's report in a healthcare lia-
bility case. 157
* Venue and joinder rulings pursuant to Section 15.003(b) of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.' 58
Stay of ALL proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of ap-
peal, regardless of when the motion upon which the interlocutory order is
based is filed:
* Order certifying or refusing to certify a class. 159
II. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
There are three basic steps to preserving error in the trial court. First,
state a clear objection. Second, get a ruling on the objection. Third,
make certain that your objection and ruling are both in the appellate re-
cord. 160 The Texas Supreme Court issued a series of opinions during the
Survey period making it clear that arguments will not be reviewed on
appeal absent strict compliance with each of these three steps.
A. OBJECTIONS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
As a general rule, an objection in the trial court is a necessary prerequi-
site to preserving an argument for appeal.' 6' In a series of cases, the
Texas Supreme Court emphasized that this general rule will not be over-
151. Id. § 51.014(a)(5).
152. Id. § 51.014(a)(8).
153. Id. § 51.014(a)(1).
154. Id. § 51.014(a)(2).
155. Id. § 51.014(a)(6).
156. Id. § 51.014(a)(9).
157. Id. § 51.014(a)(10).
158. Id. § 15.003(b).
159. Id. § 51.014(a)(3).
160. See TEX. R. App. P. 33.1.
161. See TEX. R. APp. P. 33.1; In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003) ("Our
procedural rules state that any complaint to a jury charge is waived unless specifically in-
cluded in an objection.").
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looked, even where the complaint on appeal involves constitutional ques-
tions and parental rights. 162
In In re J.F. C.,163 the supreme court found it was error to fail to instruct
the jury that a parent's right could not be terminated unless it is in the
best interests of the child. 164 The court recognized that the omission of
this important element may have just been a typographical error. 165
However, because there was no objection to the omission, the court con-
cluded that the element was deemed found by the trial court pursuant to
Rule 279 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 166 The court rejected the
parent's argument that a deemed finding violated the due process clause
of the United States and Texas Constitutions. 167 The majority also re-
jected the dissent's position that the error in omitting an element was
fundamental error that should be reviewed notwithstanding the failure to
object. 168 The majority reasoned that "deeming an omitted finding in
support of a judgment in a parental termination case when that finding is
supported by clear and convincing evidence does not adversely affect any
'fundamental public policy' found in the Texas Constitution or statutes"
because the deemed finding provision of Rule 279 "simply means that a
court, rather than a jury, has supplied a finding that is supported by clear
and convincing evidence on one of the elements of parental
termination. "169
The supreme court also declined in J.F.C. to reach the question of
whether a constitutional due process challenge to the broad-form submis-
sion of the parental termination question could be raised for the first time
on appeal because the "evidence conclusively establishes that each parent
engaged in a course of conduct described by sub-Section 161.001(1) of the
Family Code. 170 Following J.F.C., the supreme court was asked repeat-
edly during the Survey period to address the constitutionality of a broad-
form submission of the parental termination question. The Court repeat-
edly declined to reach the issue because there was no objection at trial to
the broad-form submission.171
162. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 273-74 (Tex. 2002).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 259.
165. Id. at 261.
166. Id. at 262.
167. Id. at 263, 272-73.
168. Id. at 274-75. The dissent criticized the court by "failing to resolve the conflict
among [the appellate courts] as to whether they may review unpreserved error in termina-
tion cases." Id. at 285 (Hankinson, J., dissenting, joined by Enoch, J., dissenting). The
dissent would have applied the fundamental error standard to review the charge error. Id.
at 293.
169. Id. at 275. Notably, the parents made no factual sufficiency challenge to the evi-
dence. Id.
170. Id. at 277.
171. See, e.g., id. at 274; In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349-50 (Tex. 2003); see also In re
K.N.R., 113 S.W.3d 365, 366 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); In re A.F., 113 S.W.3d 363, 364 (Tex.
2003) (per curiam); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Tex. 2003).
[Vol. 57
Appellate Practice & Procedure
The supreme court reiterated in numerous opinions the "strong policy
considerations favoring preservation" in the trial court and concluded
that these policies outweighed the interests of the parents in parental
rights termination cases. 172 In In re B.L.D.,173 the court considered two
narrow exceptions to the preservation requirement, including fundamen-
tal error and constitutional principles of due process. The court reasoned
that fundamental error-"describ[ing] situations in which an appellate
court may review error that was neither raised in the trial court nor as-
signed on appeal-is a 'discredited doctrine"' that should apply only in
criminal and quasi-criminal cases. 174 Thus, the supreme court declined to
apply the fundamental error doctrine to parental rights termination
cases.
175
Additionally, the Court explained that just because the issue involves
the parents' constitutional rights does not justify overlooking procedural
rules.176 Indeed, the supreme court explained that it presumes that the
rules governing preservation of error comport with due process. 177 Thus,
the supreme court held that as "a general rule, [and absent any claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel] due process does not mandate that ap-
pellate courts review unpreserved complaints of charge error in parental
rights termination cases."'1 78
B. DELAYS IN MAKING OBJECTIONS
A party can waive an objection by waiting too long to raise it. In Labo-
ratory Corp. of America v. Compton,179 the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals held that a defendant waived her right to seek sanctions for the
plaintiffs' conduct in the first trial by waiting until completion of a second
trial to raise the complaint. 180 The defendant relied on the grounds in the
sanctions motion to obtain a new trial, but sat on her rights until after she
was successful in a subsequent trial. 181 Thus, the court of appeals held
that the defendant waived her sanctions complaint. 182
172. B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d at 350; see also K.N.R., 113 S.W.3d at 366; In re A.F., 113
S.W.3d at 364; A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 358.
173. B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d at 349.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 351.
176. Id. at 352 ("we presume that our rules governing preservation of error in civil cases
comport with due process.").
177. Id.
178. Id. at 354.
179. Laboratory Corp. of Am. v. Compton, 126 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2003, Rule 53.7(f) motion filed 12-31-03).





C. SCOPE OF THE OBJECTION
1. Objections Found Insufficient to Preserve Error Raised on Appeal
It is a longstanding principle that the objection in the trial court must
match the argument made on appeal. During the Survey period, the su-
preme court left significant confusion on the question of how clear the
objection must be to justify appellate review. In In re L.M.I.,183 the Texas
Supreme Court found that a father could not challenge the constitutional-
ity of his affidavit relinquishing his parental rights on appeal, because the
father did not cite to the Constitution or make a constitutional argument
in the trial court and did not raise the issue in any post-judgment
motion.184
In a plurality opinion, the supreme court also expressed frustration
with the inarticulate wording of the wife's appellate briefing, which the
plurality admitted made it difficult for the court to decipher exactly what
the wife's complaint was on appeal. As a result, the plurality held that
although the mother presented evidence at trial as to the false promises
made to her to coerce her to sign the affidavit, her failure to expressly
articulate in the trial court that she was challenging the enforceability of
her affidavit waived her right to challenge the affidavit on appeal. 185
Other members of the court disagreed with this conclusion, believing
that the mother was not challenging the enforceability of the affidavit,
but rather was raising a legal sufficiency challenge to the trial court's ter-
mination of her parental rights based on the affidavit. 186 The dissent, au-
thored by Justice Hecht, pointedly attacked the plurality opinion, stating
that there is no confusion as to the mother's position:
[s]he contends that in signing her affidavit of relinquishment she was
unduly influenced by the kindness of some of the participants in the
process and defrauded by promises that her sons' adoptive parents
would send her pictures and update her on their progress. This was
her position in the trial court; it was her argument in the court of
appeals, was briefed by the parties, and was decided by the court; it
is still her argument here. 187
Justice Hecht criticized that "[t]o miss the simple arguments these parents
make, one would seemingly have to understand as little English as Ri-
cardo [the father] does."1 88 Justice Hecht pleaded that to "order that
children be taken from their parents" for solely "technical reasons of ap-
pellate procedure, without regard for the parents' arguments is hard to
justify" and to do so "based solely on a rigid reading of a brief, is in my
view indefensible.' 89
183. In re L.M.I. 119 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. 2003).
184. Id. at 710.
185. Id. at 711-12 (O'Neill, J. , joined by Justices Enoch, Schneider and Smith).
186. Id. at 730 (Owen, J., joined by Phillips, C.J.).
187. Id. at 732.
188. Id. at 732-33.
189. Id. at 733.
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2. Objections Found Sufficient to Preserve Error for Appeal
An objection to the trial court's use of the wrong date in submitting a
defendant's limitations defense is sufficient to preserve a complaint on
appeal as to a defective jury charge submission.1 90 In Holubec v.
Brandenberger,191 the plaintiffs brought nuisance claims against their
neighboring sheepfarmers. At trial, the defendants objected to the trial
court's incorrect instruction to the jury on their limitations defense under
the Right to Farm Act, complaining that the instruction did not tell the
jury the proper date to consider in assessing the limitations defense.1 92
Defendants conceded on appeal that their own tendered submission did
not track the statutory provisions precisely.' 93 However, the supreme
court found that the defendants did not have to submit their own substan-
tially correct question (despite the fact that they had the burden on the
affirmative defense) because the question actually submitted was
defective. 194
C. ARGUMENTS NOT RAISED IN RESPONSE TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
While the grounds for objecting to issues at trial must be stated with
particularity or risk being waived, the standards may not be as stringent
when objecting to an opponent's summary judgment motion. A no-evi-
dence summary judgment motion must state the elements as to which
there is no evidence.1 95 In In re Estate of Swanson,196 the El Paso Court
of Appeals reversed its prior precedent1 9 7 and joined the San Antonio
and Houston Fourteenth District Courts of Appeals in holding that "even
if the nonmovant does not object or respond to a defective no-evidence
motion, if it is conclusory, general, or does not state the elements for
which there is no evidence, it cannot support the judgment and may be
challenged for the first time on appeal." 198
D. PRESERVING ISSUES THROUGH A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
A party should file a motion for new trial to preserve factual sufficiency
points and to raise new evidence that was not available at the time of
190. See Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 39 (Tex. 2003).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 38-39.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 39.
195. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
196. In re Estate of Swanson, No. 08-02-00154-CV, 2003 WL 22215240 (Tex. App.-El
Paso Sept. 25, 2003, no pet. h.).
197. See Walton v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 65 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2001, pet. denied); Walton v. City of Midland, 24 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2000, no pet.).
198. Swanson, 2003 WL 22215240 at *2 (citing Crocker v. Paulyne's Nursing Home,
Inc., 95 S.W.3d 416, 419 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.); Callaghan Ranch, Ltd. v. Kil-
lam, 53 S.W.3d 1, 3-4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied)); see also Cuyler v.
Minns, 60 S.W.3d 209, 212-14 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
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trial.199 A party may file an amended motion for new trial without leave
of court "before any earlier motion for new trial is overruled and within
thirty days after the judgment. ' 200 An amended motion for new trial
filed more than thirty days after judgment is signed is untimely.20 1 Thus,
the supreme court reasoned in Moritz v. Presiss, that even though the
trial court has inherent power to modify, vacate, correct, or reform the
judgment during its plenary power, if the trial court does not so change
the judgment, the matters raised in an amended motion for new trial filed
more than thirty days after the judgment is signed are not preserved for
appeal. 20 2 In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court overruled its
1983 opinion in Jackson v. Van Winkle,203 "to the extent that it allows
appellate review of a trial court's decision to deny an untimely new trial
motion. "204
III. JUDGMENTS
A. FINALITY IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT CONTEXT
Whether a trial court's summary judgment order is intended to be a
final order disposing of all claims depends on the trial court's intent.205
In re Campbell, the First District Court of Appeals held that the trial
court's notification to the parties that it believed it lacked jurisdiction to
rule reflected the trial court's intent to enter a final judgment. 20 6
B. FINALITY AFTER A CONVENTIONAL TRIAL ON THE MERITS
As in prior Survey periods, the supreme court once again addressed the
question of whether a judgment that did not expressly dispose of the
plaintiffs' claims against one of multiple defendants was final. In Moritz
v. Presiss, survivors of a womAn who died after a kidney biopsy sued four
healthcare providers.20 7 No jury questions were submitted at trial as to
one of the four defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff sought to raise cer-
tain arguments that had been raised only in an amended motion for new
trial filed more than thirty days after judgment. Plaintiff admitted that if
the judgment entered by the trial court were final, these arguments were
not preserved for appeal. To avoid this result, plaintiff argued that the
199. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2), (3); see also In re B.K.D., No. 2-02-289-CV, 2003
WL 22110416, at *3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Sept. 11, 2003, pet. denied) (finding that ap-
pellant waived factual sufficiency challenge to order terminating her parental rights by
failing to file a motion for new trial).
200. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(b).
201. See Moritz v. Presiss, 121 S.W.3d 715, 720 (Tex. 2003).
202. Id.
203. Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 808 (Tex. 1983).
204. Moritz, 121 S.W.3d at 721.
205. In re Campbell, 101 S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, orig.
proceeding).
206. Id.; see also Hinson v. Thompson, 112 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, no
pet. h.) (finding summary judgment not final because judgment did not dispose of all
claims and did not contain finality language) (per curiam).
207. Moritz, 121 S.W.3d at 717.
[Vol. 57
Appellate Practice & Procedure
judgment entered by the trial court was not final because it did not men-
tion the defendant not pursued at trial. The court of appeals agreed with
the plaintiff. However, citing to its opinion in Lehmann v. Har-Con
Corp.,208 the supreme court reiterated that if a "judgment actually dis-
poses of every issue in a case, then it is not interlocutory simply because it
does not include one of the parties. ' 20 9 The supreme court concluded
that because there was "nothing to indicate that the trial court did not
intend to finally dispose of the entire case," and the trial court did not
submit the defendant's liability to the jury, the judgment was presumed
final even though it did not expressly mention the defendant.210
C. FINALITY IN THE SEVERANCE CONTEXT
Severance of an interlocutory judgment from unresolved claims ren-
ders the judgment in the severed action final unless the trial court indi-
cates that further proceedings are to be had in the severed action.211
Consistent with this rule, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a notice
of appeal, filed almost five months after a severance order was signed,
was untimely.212 The court further held that a trial court is not required
to assess costs for its judgment to be final.213
D. FINALITY OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS
In B.C. v. Rhodes, the Austin Court of Appeals drew a distinction be-
tween family protective orders rendered during the pendency of the par-
ties' divorce (which are not final appealable judgments) and those
rendered post-divorce or in the absence of a pending divorce proceeding
(which are final and appealable). 214
E. ENFORCING AND SUPERSEDING THE JUDGMENT
A trial court has an affirmative duty to enforce its judgment. 215 The
rules of appellate procedure allow a judgment debtor to supersede a judg-
ment by posting a security set by the trial court. 216 The filing of an appeal
does not alone suspend enforcement of a judgment.217 Thus, in the case
of In re Crow-Billingsley Air Park, Ltd., the supreme court held that the
trial court had jurisdiction to hear a motion to enforce the final judgment
208. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tex. 2001).
209. Moritz, 121 S.W.3d at 719.
210. Id. at 718.
211. See Thompson v. Beyer, 91 S.W.3d 902, 904 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.). Cf
U.S. Builders, Inc. v. Atd. Louetta, L.P., 95 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, no
pet.) (severed judgment not final because did not dispose of all claims and all parties).
212. Thompson, 91 S.W.3d at 904.
213. Id.
214. B.C. v. Rhodes, 116 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet. h.).
215. In re Crow-Billingsley Air Park, Ltd, 98 S.W.3d 178, 179 (Tex. 2003) (orig.
proceeding).




despite the fact that the judgment had been appealed. 218
Moreover, the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to review the suffi-
ciency of a bond on any party's motion.2 1 9 Thus, an appellate court does
not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion to provide additional security
unless a motion to increase the amount of a supersedeas bond has first
been presented to the trial court and the trial court has made a ruling on
the motion.22 0
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S PLENARY POWER
A. POWER TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL
Is an order granting a new trial effective when signed during plenary
jurisdiction, even if the order is not filed in the court's record until after
plenary jurisdiction expires? The First District Court of Appeals was
faced with this question in Coinmach, Inc. v. Aspenwood Apt. Corp. and
concluded that the date of signing, rather than the date of filing, con-
trols.22 1 In Coinmach, after the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal,
and only two days before its plenary power expired, the trial court signed
an order granting a new trial.22 2 However, the order was not filed by the
clerk until six days later, after plenary power had expired. In the wake of
the appellees' arguments that the new trial was granted untimely and to
avoid waiving its appeal should appellees be proven correct, the appellant
filed a motion with the court of appeals seeking to abate the appeal pend-
ing resolution of the new trial. Relying on the Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Texas Supreme Court's opinions in Board of Trustees of Bastrop
v. Toungate223 and In re Barber,224 the court of appeals held that the trial
court granted the new trial during its plenary jurisdiction regardless of
when the order was filed by the clerk.2 25
Additionally, if the trial court still has plenary power it must hear evi-
dence in support of a motion for new trial, even if the hearing is con-
ducted after the motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law.2 26
B. POWER TO ENFORCE A JUDGMENT
A trial court has the power to enforce its judgments even after its ple-
218. Id.
219. Law Eng'g & Envt'l Servs., Inc. v. Slosburg Co., 100 S.W.3d 389, 390 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
220. Id.
221. Coinmach, Inc. v. Aspenwood Apt. Corp., 98 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
222. Id. at 378.
223. Bd. of Trustees of Bastrop v. Toungate, 958 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. 1997).
224. In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. 1998) (holding that the date of signing
rather than the date of entry by the clerk controls whether the granting of a new trial was
timely).
225. Coinmach, 98 S.W.3d at 382.
226. Hawkins v. Howard, 97 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
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nary power expires, and such orders are not appealable. 227 However, the
trial court may not, in enforcing its judgment, modify the judgment.2 28
V. PERFECTING APPEAL
A. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
If any party makes a timely motion for new trial, to modify the judg-
ment, or to reinstate a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law
in a case where such findings are required or could be considered by the
court of appeals, "the notice of appeal must be filed within [ninety] days
after the judgment is signed. '229 The trial court cannot extend the time
for filing a notice of appeal by delaying the filing of findings of fact.230
Moreover, because there are no fact findings to be made in a trial on
stipulated facts, a request for findings in such a case will not extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal. 231
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court declined to re-
solve the question of whether a request for findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law will extend the deadline for perfecting appeal in accelerated
appeals.232 In an accelerated appeal, the appellant ordinarily must file a
notice of appeal within twenty days after the trial court signs the relevant
order.233 Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a)(4) provides that a
notice of appeal may be filed within ninety days after the judgment is
signed if any party timely files a request for findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. 234 As the supreme court noted, based on use of the term
"judgment" in Rule 26.1(a)(4), "[c]ourts and scholars disagree about
whether filing a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law ex-
tends the deadline for perfecting an appeal when the appeal is acceler-
ated. '235 Despite recognizing this ambiguity in the law, the supreme
227. Wall Street Deli, Inc. v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 110 S.W.3d 67, 69-70 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.).
228. Id. at 70.
229. TEX. R. Civ. P. 26.1(a)(4).
230. See TEX. R. App. P. 2; see also Wortham v. Calame, 91 S.W.3d 426 (Tex. App.-
Waco 2002, no pet.) (City could not blame notice of appeal filed more than one hundred
days late on trial court's delay in filing findings of fact and conclusions of law because
"Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 expressly prohibits this court from suspending the require-
ments of the appellate rules in a manner which will 'alter the time for perfecting an appeal
in a civil case."') (quoting TEX. R. App. P. 2) (Memorandum Opinion) (per curiam).
231. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 104 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (In reviewing a
Texas Workforce Commission decision, which is reviewed under a de novo standard of
review, submitted on agreed stipulations, a request for findings of fact and conclusions of
law did not extend the deadline for perfecting their appeal.).
232. See Hone v. Hanafin, 104 S.W.3d 884, 887 n.2 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam).
233. ld- at 886; TEX. R Ap . 26.1(b),; sec also TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
234. TEX. R. Civ. P. 26.1(a)(4).
235. Hone, 104 S.W.3d at 887-88 (comparing Hone v. Hanafin, 105 S.W.3d 15 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (holding request for findings and conclusions does not
extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal) with John Hill Cayce, Jr., et al., Civil
Appeals in Texas: Practicing Under the New Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 BAYLOR L.
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court disposed of the case on other grounds and expressly did not reach
this question.236
B. EXTENSIONS OF TIME TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL
As noted in prior Surveys, a motion for extension of time is necessarily
implied when a party, acting in good faith, files a notice of appeal beyond
the time allowed by Rule 26.1, but within the fifteen-day grace period
provided by Rule 26.3 for filing a motion for extension of time.237 How-
ever, the extension is not guaranteed. A party filing the late notice of
appeal must reasonably explain the need for the extension.238 Any expla-
nation short of deliberate or intentional non-compliance with the Rules
of Appellate Procedure will constitute a "reasonable explanation. '239
In this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court explained that the ap-
pellant need not admit that the appeal was untimely to have a reasonable
explanation for filing a late notice of appeal. 240 On the contrary, an ap-
pellant's (or his counsel's) belief that the appeal is timely shows that the
failure to file timely was not intentional or deliberate.2 41 In Hone v.
Hanafin, the trial court signed an order sustaining a special appear-
ance.242 To appeal an interlocutory order denying a special appearance,
the notice of appeal must be filed within twenty days from the date the
order is signed.243 Appellants filed their notice of appeal twenty-two
days after the order was signed.244 In response to questions on appeal
about the timeliness of the notice of appeal, appellants explained that
they believed their notice of appeal was timely because their request for
findings of fact and conclusions of law had extended the time for filing
the notice of appeal. The Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that "be-
cause [Appellants] only provided explanations 'for why their notice of
appeal was timely filed,' they failed to 'offer any explanation for their
failure to timely file their notice of appeal."' 2 45 The supreme court dis-
agreed, holding that a "court of appeals cannot require appellants to ad-
mit that their filings were untimely if they offer a plausible good faith
REV. 867, 880 (1997) (concluding that a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law
should extend the time to file an accelerated appeal)).
236. Id. at 887 n.2 ("Because we do not reach Petitioners' second issue, we do not con-
sider whether a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law extends the appellate
timetable in an interlocutory appeal under Rule 26.1(b).")
237. TEX. R. App. P. 26.3, 10.5(b)(1)(C); see Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617-
18 (Tex. 1997).
238. See Jones v. City of Houston, 976 S.W.2d 676, 677 (Tex. 1998).
239. See Hone, 104 S.W.3d at 887; see also Hykonnen v. Baker Hughes Bus. Support
Servs., 93 S.W.3d 562, 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing Garcia v.
Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex. 1989)).
240. Hone, 104 S.W.3d at 885.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 886.
243. TEX. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(4).
244. Hone, 104 S.W.3d at 885.
245. Id. (quoting Hone v. Hanaffin, 105 S.W.3d 15, 20 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet.
denied).
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justification for filing their notice of appeal when they did. '246 The court
also held that in light of the disputed state of the law on whether a re-
quest for findings and conclusions extends the time for filing a notice of
appeal in accelerated appeals, the Appellants supplied a reasonable ex-
planation for filing their notice of appeal more than twenty days after the
order was signed.247
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held in Hykonnen v. Baker
Hughes Business Support Services that the inability of a would-be appel-
lant to convince his lawyers to continue to represent him at low or no cost
was not a "reasonable explanation. '248 On the contrary, the evidence
showed that the appellant deliberately and intentionally bypassed the
time for filing the notice of appeal, hoping to find an affordable lawyer
within the fifteen-day grace period.249
C. STANDING TO APPEAL
The United States Supreme Court in Devlin v. Scardelletti held that
unnamed class members are not required to intervene in order to appeal
a trial court's judgment approving a class settlement.250 In City of San
Benito v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., the Texas Supreme Court followed
Devlin and reversed the court of appeals's decision, which had held that
unnamed class members lacked standing to appeal the trial court's judg-
ment because they did not formally intervene.251 Under Texas jurispru-
dence, an appeal can generally only be brought by a named party to the
suit unless the appellant can be deemed a party under the doctrine of
virtual representation. 252 Virtual representation exists when: (1) the per-
son is bound by the judgment; (2) privity of estate, title, or interest ap-
pears from the record; and (3) there is an identity of interest between the
appellant and a party to the judgment.253 The Texas Supreme Court lik-
ened the virtual representation doctrine to the rule announced in Devlin
and agreed with the United States Supreme Court that the most impor-
tant consideration is whether the appellant is bound by the judgment. 254
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the unnamed class members
should be considered "parties" with standing to appeal because they
would be bound to the judgment approving the class settlement. 255
Section 15.003(c) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code gives
standing to "a person seeking intervention or joinder who is unable to
246. Id. at 886.
247. Id. at 887.
248. Hykonnen v. Baker Hughes Bus. Support Servs., 93 S.W.3d 562, 564 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
249. Id. at 563.
250, Devlin v. Scarde!letti, 536 U.S. 1, 6-7 (002
251. City of San Benito v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 109 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Tex. 2003).
252. Id. at 754-55.
253. Id. at 755 (citing Motor Vehicle Bd. of the Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. El Paso Indep.





independently establish proper venue, or a person opposing intervention
or joinder of such a person" to file an interlocutory appeal from a ruling
on intervention. 256 In Ramirez v. Collier,257 Wiegel, a Wisconsin resident,
intervened after Ramirez sued Collier. The trial court struck Wiegel's
intervention and both Ramirez and Wiegel brought an interlocutory ap-
peal.258 The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as to Ramirez because
the orders appealed from did not affect his rights and because Section
15.003(c) did not give him standing to bring an interlocutory appeal.259
D. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
Any bona fide attempt to file a notice of appeal within the time for
filing a notice of appeal will invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction.260
This point is especially true where the confusion as to the notice of appeal
results from the court of appeals's own error. In Briscoe v. Goodmark
Corp.,261 an employee defendant sought to appeal from a judgment in
favor of his employer. However, on appeal, the court of appeals deter-
mined that the judgment was not final and remanded the matter to the
trial court for further proceedings. 262 The trial court entered a new judg-
ment, which the defendant also appealed. In considering the second ap-
peal, the appellate court reversed its original determination that the
judgment was not final and then held that the second notice of appeal
(filed nine months after the original judgment was signed) was untimely
and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.263 On review, the su-
preme court held that the court of appeals properly reconsidered its origi-
nal ruling as to the finality of the judgment, but improperly dismissed the
defendants' appeal.264 The court reasoned that "[a]s incorrect as that de-
cision [in the first appeal] was, as a matter of law, the judgment was then
interlocutory. Consequently, the court should have asserted jurisdiction
over [the defendant's] second appeal and considered his issues on the
merits. ' 265 The court recognized that the defendant had done everything
possible to preserve his appellate rights, and he would not lose those
rights simply because the court of appeals later found its own decision to
256. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
257. Ramirez v. Collier, 123 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, rule
53.7(f) motion filed).
258. Id. at 45.
259. Id.
260. Linwood v. NCNB Tex., 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994); see also Gregorian v.
Ewell, 106 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that the filing
of a cash deposit in lieu of supersedeas bond within the time period for filing a notice of
appeal, where the appellant's intent to appeal was made known and where the appellee
claimed no surprise that appellant intended to appeal, constitutes a bona fide attempt to
invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court).
261. Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. 2003).
262. Id. at 715.
263. Id. at 716.
264. Id. at 717.
265. Id.
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be erroneous.2 66
In LaGoye v. Victoria Wood Condominium Ass'n,267 the Fourteenth
District Court of Appeals found that the appellant had made a bona fide
attempt to appeal a summary judgment ruling despite failing to properly
indicate the cause number appealed from in the notice of appeal. Noting
the general rule that an appellate court has jurisdiction over any "bona
fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction," the court of appeals found
that where there is no confusion as to which judgment appellant intends
to appeal, the placement of the wrong case number on the notice of ap-
peal will not "defeat the appellate court's jurisdiction. 2 68 In LaGoye,
the trial court granted summary judgment for certain defendants, which
judgment was subsequently severed into a different cause number. Be-
cause appellees had participated in the appeal without complaint as to the
nature of the subject matter of the appeal and because the summary judg-
ment motion referenced in the notice was the only summary judgment
granted at the time the notice of appeal was filed, the court found that the
misnumbering on the notice "caused no confusion regarding the judg-
ment from which LaGoye seeks to appeal," and thus, found it had juris-
diction over the appeal.2 69
VI. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.5(c) allows a clerk's record to be
supplemented with relevant items originally omitted from the clerk's re-
cord.270 Under this rule, the trial court, appellate court, or any party may
direct the trial court clerk to supplement the clerk's record. The rule
does not require a party to obtain a ruling from any court before a sup-
plemental clerk's record is included in the record on appeal.271 Neither
does the rule contemplate an opposing motion to strike a supplemental
clerk's record.272 According to the plain language of the rule, items in-
cluded in a supplemental clerk's record become part of the appellate re-
cord when a party or a court directs the trial court clerk to prepare and
file a supplemental clerk's record.2 73
Notably, however, while the parties may supplement the appellate re-
cord with items they deem relevant, nothing in the rule compels the court
on appeal to consider those items in reaching its decision.274 For exam-
ple, to the extent the supplemental clerk's record contains evidence that
was not before the trial court at the time it rendered its decision, the
266. Id.
267. LaGoye v. Victoria Wood Condo. Ass'n, 112 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
268. Id. at 782.
269. d.
270. TEX. R. App. P. 34.5(c); Roventini v. Ocular Scis., Inc., 111 S.W.3d 719, 725 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
271. Roventini, 111 S.W.3d at 725.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 726.
2004]
SMU LAW REVIEW
court of appeals cannot consider the evidence, notwithstanding its inclu-
sion in the record on appeal.275
Similarly, Rule 34.6(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
grants the court on appeal broad authority to supplement the reporter's
record on its own motion, if anything relevant is omitted from the record,
so long as supplementation does not unreasonably delay disposition of
the appeal.276 The trial court and the parties may also direct a supple-
mental reporter's record under this rule.277
VII. THE BRIEF ON APPEAL
Inadequately briefed issues can be waived on appeal.278 Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38.1(h) provides that, for an issue to be properly
before the court, the issue must be supported by argument and authori-
ties and must contain appropriate citation to the record.2 79 In Trebesch v.
Morris, the court found waiver where appellants' brief provided no dis-
cussion, analysis, or evidence in the record pertaining to their argument
that there was an issue of fact regarding which party breached the con-
tract at issue in the case.280
And in Plummer v. Reeves,281 the appeal was dismissed for want of
prosecution after the pro se party, a doctor, had been given three oppor-
tunities to file a brief that complied with the rules. The court explained
that appellant's brief contained "only sporadic citation to the record (de-
spite her lengthy allusions to purported facts appearing of record) and no
citation to any legal authority to support her ten issues," despite the fact
that appellant "knew of her duty to cite to legal authority [as] exemplified
by her statement in her brief that she cited to none because 'she is not an
attorney and is not trained as an attorney.'"282 The court reasoned:
"[s]imply stating that one opts to forgo researching the law because he is
not an attorney is unacceptable, especially when (1) that person has an
education, (2) that person illustrates no effort to discover or obtain perti-
nent authority, and (3) the law is one of the most indexed bodies of writ-
ing in existence. '283 Citing Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.9(a)
and 38.8(a)(1), and finding a "flagrant violation of the briefing rules," the
275. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Hedges argued that the court on appeal should
decline to file any material that was not before the trial court, even though designated by a
party as a "supplemental clerk's record." Id. at 727 (Hedges, J., concurring). He reasoned
that, under the language of Rule 34.5(c), only relevant items may be included in a supple-
mental clerk's record and material that was not before the trial court is not relevant to the
appeal. Id.
276. GMR Gymnastics Sales, Inc. v. Walz, 117 S.W.3d 57, 60 n.2 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2003, pet. denied).
277. TEX. R. App. P. 34.6(d).
278. Trebesch v. Morris, 118 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
279. TEX. R. App. P. 38.1(h).
280. Trebesh, 118 S.W.3d at 824-25.
281. Plummer v. Reeves, 93 S.W.3d 930 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied).
282. Id. at 931.
283. Id.
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court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. 284
VIII. WAIVER ON APPEAL
An appellant "must attack all independent bases or grounds that fully
support a complained-of ruling or judgment. '285 If the appellant fails to
do so, the court of appeals "must affirm the ruling or judgment. ' 286 As a
general rule, an appellate court cannot alter an erroneous judgment in
favor of an appellant who fails to challenge error on appeal. The reason-
ing behind this rule is that,
if an independent ground fully supports the complained-of ruling or
judgment, but the appellant assigns no error to that independent
ground, then (1) [the appellate court] must accept the validity of that
unchallenged independent ground,... and thus (2) any error in the
grounds challenged on appeal is harmless because the unchallenged
independent ground fully supports the complained-of ruling or
judgment.287
This principle is most commonly applied in the summary judgment con-
text, when an order granting summary judgment does not specify which
of the multiple grounds the judgment is rendered and the appellant fails
to negate all grounds raised in the motion for summary judgment.288 In
this circumstance, the summary judgment must be affirmed if it may have
been rendered, properly or improperly, on a ground not challenged by the
appellant.289 Appellate courts will similarly overrule a challenge to fact
findings that underpin a legal conclusion or disposition when the appel-
lant fails to challenge other fact findings that also support that legal con-
clusion or disposition.290 A court of appeals will likewise affirm a
judgment when more than one legal conclusion or jury finding indepen-
dently supports a judgment but the appellant attacks only one of the find-
ings or legal conclusions on appeal.2 91
During the Survey period, the First District Court of Appeals in Britton
concluded that this principle also applies in the plea to the jurisdiction
context. Under Britton, when a plea to the jurisdiction is based on multi-
ple grounds and the trial court sustains the plea without specifying
284. Id.
285. Britton v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. See Strather v. Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. dlb/a Dollar Gen. Stores, 96 S.W.3d
420, 422-23 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.). In its opinion on rehearing, the Texar-
kana court in Strather struggled with the unfairness that can occur, in some circumstances,
as a result of the rule requiring an appellant to attack all grounds raised in the motion for
summary judgment. The court concluded that a trial court can, and should, disclose in its
order the reasons it grants summary judgment, and urged the Texas Supreme Court to
adopt rules requiring the trial court to do so. Id. at 426 n.3.
289. Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 682.
290. Id. See Kent v. Citizens State Bank, 99 S.W.3d 870, 874 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2003, pet. denied).
291. Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 682.
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grounds, the court on appeal must affirm the trial court's order if the
appellant fails to challenge all of the grounds-valid or invalid-specified




A restricted appeal is a direct attack on a judgment. 293 To succeed on
restricted appeal, the appellant must (1) file his notice of appeal within
six months after judgment is signed, (2) be a party to the lawsuit, (3)
have not participated at trial or filed a timely post-judgment motion or
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and (4) demonstrate
error on the face of the record.2 94 The scope of review in a restricted
appeal is the same as in an ordinary appeal-a review of the entire
case.2 9 5 The only restriction is that the error must appear on the face of
the record. 296 The "face of the record," for purposes of restricted appeal
review, consists of the reporter's record, as well as all the papers on file
with the court when it rendered judgment.2 97 As with ordinary appeals,
the court on appeal may not consider, as part of the record, evidence or
documents that were not before the trial court when it rendered
judgment.2 98
A party claiming error in a restricted appeal based on the trial court's
failure to give him notice of trial carries a heavy burden. Typically, the
record will contain no affirmative proof of the error claimed because the
rules of procedure do not impose a duty on the trial court, or its person-
nel, to place in the case file evidence that notice of a trial setting was
given.299 As a result, an absence in the record of affirmative proof of
notice does not establish error on the face of the record. 300
In contrast, when a court of appeals reviews a restricted appeal, there
are no presumptions of valid issuance, service, and return of citation.30 1
Accordingly, an absence in the record of affirmative proof of strict com-
pliance with the rules governing service of process establishes error on
the face of the record for purposes of a restricted appeal.30 2 This is so,
292. Id. at 678.
293. Roventini v. Ocular Scis., Inc., 111 S.W.3d 719, 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
294. Id.; Autozone, Inc. v. Duenes, 108 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2003, no pet.).
295. Roventini, 111 S.W.3d at 721; Autozone, 108 S.W.3d at 919-20.
296. Roventini, 111 S.W.3d at 721; Autozone, 108 S.W.3d at 920.
297. Roventini, 111 S.W.3d at 721-22; Autozone, 108 S.W.3d at 920. Redding v. Dick
Thompson Enters., Inc. dl/b/a Honda West, No. 2-02-142-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 184,
*3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 9, 2003, no pet.); AAA Navi Corp. v. Parrot-Ice Drink
Prods. of Am., 119 S.W.3d 401, 403 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.).
298. Roventini, 111 S.W.3d at 722, 726.
299. Redding, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 184 at *3.
300. Id. at *34.
301. Autozone, 108 S.W.3d at 920.
302. Id. at 921.
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even if the appellant fails to file a complete reporter's record-Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(c)(1)'s presumption that omitted por-
tions of the record support the judgment does not apply to a restricted
appeal attacking a default judgment on the ground that service of process
was defective. 303
A notice of restricted appeal is due six months after the date on which
the trial court's judgment is signed.304 This deadline cannot be extended,
even if the appellant receives late notice of judgment.30 5 In fact, Rule
4.2(a)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure-providing addi-
tional time to file documents when a party receives late notice of judg-
ment-expressly exempts restricted appeals from its provisions. 30 6
B. BILL OF REVIEW
A bill of review "is an independent action brought to set aside a judg-
ment that is no longer appealable or subject to challenge by a motion for
new trial. ' 30 7 It is a direct attack on a judgment and, as such, "only the
court rendering the original judgment has jurisdiction over the proceed-
ing." Accordingly, a bill of review must be filed in the same court that
rendered the judgment under attack.30 8 However, once jurisdiction has
attached in the proper court, the case may be transferred to another court
and the transferee court has the authority to determine the merits of the
bill.30
9
Because finality in judgments is important in Texas jurisprudence, the
grounds for setting aside a final judgment are limited, and bills of review
are permitted only in exceptional circumstances. 310 A bill of review peti-
tioner must have exercised due diligence to prosecute all adequate legal
remedies against a former judgment, and at the time the bill of review is
filed, "there remains no such adequate remedy still available because,
through no fault of [his], fraud, accident, or mistake precludes presenta-
tion of a meritorious claim or defense. ' 311 Accordingly, a bill of review
petitioner must plead and prove "(1) a meritorious defense to the cause
of action alleged to support the judgment (2) which [he] was prevented
303. GMR Gymnastics Sales, Inc. v. Walz, 117 S.W.3d 57, 59 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2003, pet denied).
304. TEX. R. App. P. 26.1(c), 30.
305. Maldonado v. Macaluso, 100 S.W.3d 345, 346 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no
pet.).
306. Id.; TEX. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(2) ("Exception for restricted appeal. Subparagraph (1)
does not extend the time for perfecting a restricted appeal."). But see GMR Gymnastics,
117 S.W.3d at 58 (appearing to allow extended deadlines in restricted appeal based on late
notice of judgment).




310. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003); Martindale v.
Reno, No. 11-02-00256-CV, 2003 WL 21196506, at *1 (Tex. App.-Eastland May 22, 2003,
no pet.).
311. King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751.
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from making by fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposite party (3)
unmixed with any fault or negligence of [his]." '312
Only "extrinsic" fraud, as opposed to "intrinsic" fraud, will support the
granting of relief pursuant to a bill of review.313 Extrinsic fraud "is con-
duct that prevents a real trial upon the issues involved." Intrinsic fraud
includes any matter which was actually presented to and considered by
the trial court in rendering the judgment. This includes the alleged per-
jury of a witness on a contested issue, which the opposing party had the
opportunity to refute, as well as allegations of fraud or negligence on the
part of a party's attorney.314
Procedurally, when a trial court grants a bill of review and sets aside a
judgment in a prior case, a subsequent trial on the merits of the prior case
occurs in the same proceeding as the trial on the bill of review. 315
Specifically,
To invoke the equitable powers of the court, the bill of review peti-
tioner must file a petition alleging factually and with particularity
that the prior judgment was rendered as a result of fraud, accident or
wrongful act of the opposite party or official mistake unmixed with
his own negligence. The petition must further allege, with particular-
ity, sworn facts sufficient to constitute a defense and, as a pretrial
matter, present prima facie proof to support the contention.
Second, if a prima facie defense has been shown, the court will con-
duct a trial. At this trial, the petitioner must open and assume the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the judg-
ment was rendered as the result of fraud, accident or wrongful act of
the opposite party, or official mistake unmixed with any negligence
of his own. If the petitioner meets this burden, the factfinder will
then determine whether the bill of review defendant, the original
plaintiff, has proved the elements of his original cause of action.
Once it is found that the petitioner is suffering under a wrongfully
obtained judgment that is unsupported by the weight of the evi-
dence, equity is satisfied and the court should grant the requested
relief.316
In determining whether the petitioner has presented adequate prima
facie proof, as a pretrial matter, to support a meritorious defense, the
relevant inquiry "is not whether the result would be different on retrial,
but instead whether the defense is barred as a matter of law and whether
the complainant will be entitled to judgment if no evidence to the con-
trary is offered. ' 317 This is a question of law, and the court will proceed
312. Martindale, 2003 WL 21196506 at *1; King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 752.
313. Martindale, 2003 WL 21196506 at *2; King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 752.
314. Martindale, 2003 WL 21196506 at *2; King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 752.
315. Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Mills, 110 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2003, no pet.).
316. Id. (quoting State v. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 778 S.W.2d 463, 464-65 (Tex.
1989)).
317. Martinez v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 116 S.W.3d 266, 270
(Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.).
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to trial only if such a defense has been demonstrated. 318
For purposes of appeal, a bill of review that sets aside a prior judgment
but does not dispose of the case on the merits is interlocutory and not
appealable. 319
X. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In In re J.F.C.,320 a termination of parental rights case, the Texas Su-
preme Court reiterated that due process requires application of the clear
and convincing evidence standard of proof in termination cases. 321 The
supreme court further stated that "clear and convincing evidence" is de-
fined in the Family Code as "the measure or degree of proof that will
produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to
the truth of the allegations sought to be established. '322
Noting that it had never considered "how to apply the overlay of the
clear and convincing evidence burden of proof onto our legal sufficiency,
also known as our 'no evidence,' standard of review in cases other than
defamation cases," 3 23 the court held that the "traditional legal sufficiency
standard, which upholds a finding supported by '[a]nything more than a
scintilla of evidence,' is inadequate when the United States Constitution
requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. '324 The supreme court
then stated the appropriate standard of review as follows:
In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction
that its finding was true. To give appropriate deference to the
factfinder's conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal
sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable
to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the
factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasona-
ble factfinder could do so. A corollary to this requirement is that a
court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could
have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. This does not
mean that a court must disregard all evidence that does not support
the finding. Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the
finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
If, after conducting its legal sufficiency review of the record evi-
dence, a court determines that no reasonable factfinder could form a
318. Id.
319. Hartford, 110 S.W.3d at 591.
320. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002).
321. Id. at 263.
322. ld. at 264 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (Vernon 2002)); In re C.H., 89
S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002); Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 597 (Tex. 2002).
323. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264.
324. Id. at 264-65 (citing Formosa Plastics Corp. U.S.A. v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contrac-
tors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998) (citing Cont'l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937




firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true,
then that court must conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient.
[footnote omitted] Rendition of judgment in favor of the parent
would generally be required if there is legally insufficient
evidence. 325
The supreme court disapproved of numerous decisions from the courts of
appeals holding that a legal sufficiency review in a case in which the bur-
den of proof is clear and convincing evidence is the same as in a case in
which the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 326
The supreme court also reiterated the factual standard of review it had
announced in its 2002 decision in In re C.H., stating:
In a factual sufficiency review, as we explained in In re C.H., a court
of appeals must give due consideration to evidence that the
factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.
[footnote omitted] We also explained in that opinion that the in-
quiry must be "whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the
State's allegations." [citation omitted] A court of appeals should
consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable
factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of
its finding. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that
a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the find-
ing is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have
formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually in-
sufficient. [citation omitted] A court of appeals should detail in its
opinion why it has concluded that a reasonable factfinder could not
have credited disputed evidence in favor of the finding.327
325. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
326. Id. at 267 (citing W.B. v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 82 S.W.3d
739, 741 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.)); In re J.M.M., 80 S.W.3d 232, 240 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); In re A.L.S., 74 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2002, no pet.); In re R.G., 61 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.); In re IN.,
61 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); In re L.S.R., 60 S.W.3d 376,
378 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied); In re A.V., 57 S.W.3d 51, 61-62 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2001, pet. granted); In re J.O.C., 47 S.W.3d 108, 113 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001,
no pet.); In re A.P., 42 S.W.3d 248, 256 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.); In re V.R.W., 41
S.W.3d 183, 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.); In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d
234, 238 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet.); Leal v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 25 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.); In re P.R., 994 S.W.2d 411,
415 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j.); In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137, 142
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.); In re W.A.B., 979 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); Hann v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regula-
tory Servs., 969 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, pet. denied); In re D.L.N., 958
S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, pet. denied); In re B.R., 950 S.W.2d 113, 119
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no writ); Lucas v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs.,
949 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, writ denied); Edwards v. Tex. Dep't of Pro-
tective & Regulatory Servs., 946 S.W.2d 130, 137 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no writ); Spur-
lock v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 904 S.W.2d 152, 155-56 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1995, writ denied); In re J.F., 888 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex. App.- Tyler 1994, no writ);
In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); D.O. v. Tex.
Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ); In re
L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
327. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266-67.
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In re M.S.328 involved the standard that applies to review claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel in parental-rights termination proceedings.
As an issue of first impression, the supreme court concluded that the
standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, which has been applied by the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals in the criminal context, should also be applied in parental-rights
termination proceedings. 329 Under Strickland, the defendant must show
that (1) counsel's performance was deficient (i.e., that counsel made er-
rors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaran-
teed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment); and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense (i.e., that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable). 330 The Texas Supreme Court further explained:
With respect to whether counsel's performance in a particular case
is deficient, we must take into account all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the case, and must primarily focus on whether counsel per-
formed in a "reasonably effective manner." The Court of Criminal
Appeals explained that counsel's performance falls below acceptable
levels of performance when the representation is so grossly deficient
as to render proceedings fundamentally unfair....
In this process, we must give great deference to counsel's perform-
ance, indulging "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," includ-
ing the possibility that counsel's actions are strategic. It is only when
"the conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would
have engaged in it," that the challenged conduct will constitute inef-
fective assistance. 331
In re B.L.D.,332 also a parental-rights termination case, involved the
standard for reviewing a trial court's determination of whether there was
a conflict of interest between parents opposing termination of parental
rights in a single suit. The supreme court held that an abuse-of-discretion
standard applied in such cases.333
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. WBD Oil & Gas Co. ,334 the su-
preme court addressed the question of the proper standard of review of
"contested case" determinations made by the Railroad Commission
under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act, Texas Government Code
Sections 2001.001-.902. The court noted that the APA provides "signifi-
cantly different" modes of judicial review for contested case decisions
328. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2003).
329. Id. at 544-45 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Garcia v. State,
57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812-13 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999)).
330. Id. at 545.
331. Id.
332. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. 2003).
333. Id. at 347.
334. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. WBD Oil & Gas Co., 104 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2003).
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than for rules.335 In order to obtain judicial review of a contested case
decision, an aggrieved party must "move for rehearing (except in certain
cases), [footnote omitted] must have exhausted all other administrative
remedies available, [footnote omitted] and must file a petition with the
court within thirty days of the decision. '336 By contrast, judicial review of
a rule requires the initiation of "a proceeding to contest compliance with
certain procedural requirements ... within two years of the rule's effec-
tive date. ' 337 Otherwise, "judicial review of a rule may be sought at any
time.",338
As the supreme court observed, the scope of review of a contested case
decision "varies from statute to statute. ' 339 In some matters, a court
must try the issue de novo. 340 More commonly, review is limited to "de-
termining whether the agency decision was supported by substantial
evidence."'341
In the instant case, the supreme court held that "judicial review of or-
ders adopting field rules should be the same as in other contested case
decisions."'342 As a result, the court of appeals erred in holding that Rail-
road Commission field rules "adopted in a contested case like those in-
volved here cannot be challenged in a declaratory judgment action under
Section 2001.038 of the APA."'343
In St. Joseph Hospital v. Wolff,344 a medical malpractice case, the de-
fendant hospital complained on appeal that the trial court's "joint enter-
prise" definition submitted to the jury misstated Texas law. Drawing a
distinction between an objection to the form of the definition submitted
(reviewable for abuse of discretion) and an objection that the definition
misstated Texas law, and noting that the court of appeals had reviewed
the issue under a de novo standard of review, 345 the supreme court held
that whether a definition used in the charge misstates the law is a legal
question, reviewable de novo.346
335. Id. at 74.
336. Id. at 74-75.
337. Id. at 75.
338. Id.
339. Id. (citing TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.172 (Vernon 2000) ("The scope of judi-
cial review of a state agency decision in a contested case is as provided by the law under
which review is sought.")).
340. Id. at 75 n.43 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(a) (Vernon 2000) ("If the
manner of review authorized by law for the decision in a contested case that is the subject
of complaint is by trial de novo, the reviewing court shall try each issue of fact and law in
the manner that applies to other civil suits in this state as though there had not been an
intervening agency action or decision but may not admit in evidence the fact of prior state
agency action or the nature of that action except to the limited extent necessary to show
compliance with statutory provisions that vest jurisdiction in the court.")).
341. Id. at 75, n.44 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174 (Vernon 2000)).
342. Id. at 79.
343. Id.
344. St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002).
345. St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 999 S.W.2d 579, 586 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet).
346. St. Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 525 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; M.N. Dannenbaum,
Inc. v. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ
denied) (stating that an instruction is improper if it misstates the law)).
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In Bennett v. Cochran,347 the supreme court reversed the court of ap-
peals' ruling that, by requesting only a partial reporter's record, the ap-
pellant waived his right to challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence on appeal. Relying on the language of Texas Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 34.6(c)(4), 348 the supreme court held that "an appellant
need not file a complete reporter's record to preserve legal or factual
sufficiency points.
349
Disagreeing with the decisions of several courts of appeals requiring
strict compliance, the supreme court also held that the appellant's un-
timely filing of its statement of issues on appeal as required by Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 34.6(c)(1) did not require affirmance, as the "ob-
jective behind Rule 34.6(c)(1) was fully served" and the appellee was not
prejudiced by the late filing:
Our appellate rules are designed to further the resolution of ap-
peals on the merits. [citation omitted] We will interpret these rules,
when possible, to achieve that aim. However, litigants should not
view our relaxation of rules in a particular case as endorsing non-
compliance. While we seek to resolve appeals on their merits, liti-
gants who ignore our rules do so at the risk of forfeiting appellate
relief.
Here, the objective behind Rule 34.6(c)(1) was fully served.
Cochran [the appellee] does not allege that he was deprived of an
opportunity to designate additional portions of the reporter's record,
nor does he assert that Bennett's delay otherwise prejudiced the
preparation or presentation of his case. Under these circumstances,
we hold that Rule 34.6 does not preclude appellate review of Ben-
nett's legal and factual sufficiency issues.350
In Heritage Resources, Inc. v. Hill,351 an appeal from a judgment en-
tered after a trial to the court in a suit for attorney's fees under the Texas
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act,352 the El Paso Court of Appeals
noted that there is a split among the intermediate courts of appeals re-
garding factual sufficiency review in cases in which the standard of review
is abuse of discretion. The El Paso Court of Appeals, following its 1998
decision in Lindsey v. Lindsey,353 employs a two pronged inquiry:
(1) Did the trial court have sufficient information upon which to exer-
cise its discretion; and
347. Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).
348. TEX. R. App. P. 346(c)(4) ("The appellate court must presume that the partial
reporter's record designated by the parties constitutes the entire record for purposes of
reviewing the stated points or issues. This presumption applies even if the statement in-
cludes a point or issue complaining of the legal or factual insufficiency of the evidence to
support a specific factual finding identified in that point or issue.")
349. Bennett, 96 S.W.3d at 228.
350. Id. at 229.
351. Heritage Res., Inc. v. Hill, 104 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2003, no pet.).
352. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.001 et seq. (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004).
353. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.).
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(2) Did the trial court err in its application of discretion? 354
This procedure has also been followed by the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals. 355 For other courts of appeals, "the normal sufficiency of the evi-
dence review is part of the abuse of discretion review and not an
independent ground for reversal. '356
In Tanox, Inc. v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.,357 an ap-
peal from the trial court's confirmation of an arbitration award under the
Federal Arbitration Act,35 8 the court noted that, while appellate review
of an FAA arbitration award is ordinarily de novo, the appellate court's
review is "usually 'extraordinarily narrow."' 359 Under the applicable
standard of review, it is presumed that arbitration awards will be con-
firmed and "[t]he court may not review the arbitrators' decision on the
merits even if it is alleged that the decision is based on factual error or it
misinterprets the parties' agreement. ' 360 As a result, as the court noted,
"[s]uccessful court challenges are few and far between. '361
The court rejected the appellant's argument that a contractual choice-
of-law provision providing that the "agreement shall be construed in ac-
cordance with the laws of the State of Texas" and language in the contract
stating that the parties agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration
"under the rules of the American Arbitration Association then in place
and applicable legal and equitable principles" required the arbitration
award to be judicially reviewed under "the normal appellate standard of
review. ' 362 Noting that the FAA provides four statutory grounds for va-
cating an arbitration award,363 and recognizing several common law
354. Heritage Res., Inc., 104 S.W.3d at 618.
355. Matthiessen v. Schaefer, 897 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994),
rev'd on other grounds, 915 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. 1995).
356. Heritage Res., 104 S.W.3d at 618, citing Crawford v. Hope, 898 S.W.2d 937, 940-41(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied); Thomas v. Thomas, 895 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1995, writ denied); In re Marriage of Driver, 895 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1995, no writ); Wood v. O'Donnell, 894 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1995, no writ); In re Pecht, 874 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994,
no writ).
357. Tanox, Inc. v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 105 S.W.3d 244 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
358. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1999 & Supp. 2001).
359. Tanox, 105 S.W.3d at 250 (citing Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 593
(5th Cir. 2001)).
360. Tanox, 105 S.W.3d at 250.
361. Id. at 250 (citing Gupta v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 274 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal
citations omitted)).
362. Id. at 251.
363. Under 9 U.S.C. § 10, an arbitration award may be set aside "(1) [w]here the award
was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) [wlhere there was evident partial-
ity or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) [w]here the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or any other misbe-
havior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) [w]here the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1999).
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grounds for vacatur, 364 the court focused on the appellant's claim that the
arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law, stating: "Manifest disregard of
the law is more than mere error or misunderstanding with respect to the
law. [citations omitted] Under this standard, the arbitrator clearly recog-
nizes the applicable law, but chooses to ignore it. ' ' 365 Applying this defer-
ential standard, the judgment confirming the arbitration award was
affirmed.
366
In Spohn Hospital v. Mayer,367 an appeal from a judgment for the
plaintiff in a medical negligence case, the supreme court reversed the trial
court's judgment, holding that the trial court's ruling ordering specified
portions of witness statements be taken as established facts at trial as a
discovery sanction for the defendant hospital's late production of witness
statements was excessive under the two-part test set forth in TransAmeri-
can Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell.368 Noting that sanctions are reviewed
on appeal for abuse of discretion,369 the court agreed with the defendant
hospital that the trial court failed to follow either prong of TransAmeri-
can.370 Specifically, the record contained no evidence that the sanctions
were "visited on the offender" because "neither the trial court nor the
court of appeals discusses whether counsel or their clients were responsi-
ble for the discovery abuse. '371 In addition, under the second prong of
TransAmerican, the trial court must consider "less stringent measures
before settling on severe sanctions" and "the record should contain some
explanation of the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed. ' 372 Rever-
sal on this point was appropriate because "the record is silent regarding
the consideration and effectiveness of less stringent sanctions. '373
364. Tanox, 105 S.W.3d at 252. "[There are several common law grounds for vacating
an arbitration award: (1) the arbitrator manifestly disregards the law, (2) the award is
against public policy, and (3) the award is arbitrary or capricious."
365. Id.
366. Id. at 268.
367. Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2003).
368. TransAm. Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991). As the court
noted, "TransAmerican set out a two-part test for determining whether a particular sanc-
tion is just. First, there must be a direct nexus among the offensive conduct, the offender,
and the sanction imposed. [citation omitted] A just sanction must be directed against the
abuse and toward remedying the prejudice caused to the innocent party, and the sanction
should be visited upon the offender. [citation omitted] The trial court must attempt to
determine whether the offensive conduct is attributable to counsel only, to the party only,
or to both. [citation omitted] Second, just sanctions must not be excessive. [citation omit-
ted] In other words, a sanction imposed for discovery abuse should be no more severe
than necessary to satisfy its legitimate purposes, which include securing compliance with
discovery rules, deterring other litigants from similar misconduct, and punishing violators."
Spohn Hosp., 104 S.W.3d at 882.
369. Spohn Hosp., 104 S.W.3d at 881.
370. Id. at 882.
371. Id. at 883.
372. Id. (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 852-53 (Tex. 1992)); GTE
Communications Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993); Otis Elevator Co.
v. Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. 1993)).
373. Id. at 883.
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In Williams Industries, Inc. v. Earth Development Systems Corp. ,374 the
court held that whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate is a ques-
tion of law reviewed de novo.375 The court observed that some courts of
appeals "have held that the findings on which the legal determination of
waiver is based (namely, substantial invocation of the judicial process and
prejudice) are subject to a different standard of review because they are
largely fact questions-although these courts differ somewhat as to which
standard of review applies. '376
In Wal-Mart v. Canchola,377 an employment discrimination case filed
under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, the supreme court
stated that reviewing courts engage in different analyses in discrimination
cases, depending on whether the case has been fully tried on the merits.
For discrimination cases that have not been fully tried on the merits, ap-
pellate courts apply the burden-shifting analysis established by the
United States Supreme Court.378 For discrimination cases that have been
fully tried on the merits, appellate courts do not engage in a burden-shift-
ing analysis, and instead, determine whether the evidence is legally suffi-
cient to support the jury's ultimate finding.37 9
In Kondos v. Lincoln Property Co.,380 the Dallas Court of Appeals
clarified the approach for conducting the abuse-of-discretion standard for
reviewing a trial court's order granting or denying class certification. Be-
cause the supreme court has rejected what it described as the "certify
374. Williams Indus., Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [lst Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
375. Id. at 136 (citing In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex.
1999); In re Serv. Corp. Int'l, 85 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. 2002)).
376. Id. See Pennzoil Co. v. Arnold Oil Co., Inc., 30 S.W.3d 494, 501 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2000, orig. proceeding) (Hardberger, C.J., concurring) (advocating clearly-errone-
ous standard); Cent. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 856 S.W.2d 492, 494 n.1 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (applying clear-abuse-of-discretion standard because of nature of
proceeding (mandamus), but noting that prejudice finding is normally subject to clearly-
erroneous standard), Marble Slab Creamery, Inc. v. Wesic, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 436, 438-39
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (applying clearly-erroneous standard);
Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Horizon Oil & Gas Co., 809 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (applying clearly-erroneous standard); Pepe Int'l Dev. Co.
v. Pub. Brewing Co., 915 S.W.2d 925, 929, 931-32 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet
denied) (applying no-evidence standard); cf Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Eifert, 2 S.W.3d
688, 693-94 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (combined appeal and orig.
proceeding) (holding factual questions concerning order denying arbitration; there,
whether agreement existed-subject to no-evidence review); Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London v. Celebrity, Inc., 950 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996) (noting
same), writ dism'd w.o.j., 988 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.1998); Belmont Constructors, Inc. v. Ly-
ondell Petrochem. Co., 896 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1995, no writ)
(combined appeal and orig. proceeding) (same); cf. also Pony Express Courier Corp. v.
Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ) (employing abuse-of-
discretion standard to review ruling on defense to arbitration).
377. Wal-Mart v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003).
378. Id. at 739 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43
(2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973)).
379. Wal-Mart, 121 S.W.3d at 739.
380. Kondos v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 110 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
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now and worry later" philosophy towards class certification, actual, and
not presumed, compliance with certification prerequisites is required. 38
1
Thus, reviewing courts "do not view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court's decision in either granting or denying certifi-
cation, nor do [they] entertain every presumption in favor of the trial
court's decision. '382 Rather, an abuse of discretion exists if the trial court
failed to conduct a "rigorous analysis" on whether the prerequisites to
certification have been met.383
Several cases decided this survey period examined the application of
the de novo standard for reviewing a trial court's ruling on a plea to the
jurisdiction.384 In conducting the de novo review, appellate courts do not
look at the merits of the plaintiff's case but consider only the plaintiff's
pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry.385 The
plaintiff's pleadings are to be construed liberally.386
However, while personal jurisdiction is a question of law, a trial court
must frequently decide questions of fact. On appeal, reviewing courts
may be called on to review such fact findings. 387 When the trial court
does not issue findings of fact, reviewing courts should presume that the
trial court resolved all factual disputes in favor of the judgment. 388 But
when the reporter's record and clerk's record are included in the appel-
late record, such implied findings are not conclusive and may be chal-
lenged for legal and factual sufficiency. 389
In Coalition for Long Point Preservation v. Texas Commission on Envi-
ronmental Quality,390 the court addressed the standard of review applica-
ble to an administrative order entered following a contested-case
proceeding, noting that review is under the substantial evidence rule.391
An appellate court conducting a substantial evidence review must "deter-
mine whether the evidence as a whole is such that reasonable minds
could have reached the same conclusion as the agency in the disputed
action. '392 In addition, the reviewing court cannot "substitute [its] judg-
ment for that of the agency and may only consider the record on which
381. Id. at 720 (citing S.W. Ref. Co., Inc. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000)).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. City of Dallas v. First Trade Union Say. Bank, 2003 WL 21715883, *2 (Tex. App.-
Dallas July 25, 2003, pet. filed); Stern v. KEI Consultants, Ltd., 123 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.); Harlandale Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 121 S.W.3d
88, 91-92 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
385. City of Dallas, 2003 WL 21715883, at *2; Harlandale, 121 S.W.3d at 91 (both citing
County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002)).
386. Harlandale, 121 S.W.3d at 91.
387. Stern, 123 S.W.3d at 483.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Coalition for Long Point Pres. v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 106 S.W.3d 363
(Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied).
391. Id. at 366 (citing Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174 (Vernon 2000)).
392. Id. at 366 (citing Stratton v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 8 S.W.3d 26, 30 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1999, no pet.)).
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the agency based its decision. ' 393 As stated by the court, "[t]he issue for
the reviewing court is not whether the agency reached the correct conclu-
sion, but rather whether there is some reasonable basis in the record for
its action. '394 The court also noted that "findings, inferences, conclu-
sions, and decisions of an administrative agency are presumed to be sup-
ported by substantial evidence, and the burden to prove otherwise is on
the contestant. '395
In Sedillo v. Valtierra,396 an appeal from the grant of a summary judg-
ment for the defendant based on deemed admissions, the court held that
summary judgment is proper if "a party's deemed admission defeats the
causation element of the party's cause of action. ' 397 The court reversed
the trial court's summary judgment because use of the term "and/or" in a
request for admission asking the plaintiff to admit that the defendant's
"negligence and/or negligence per se was not a proximate cause of the
accident in question," "raises a genuine issue of material fact issue re-
garding whether the deemed admission addresses both negligence claims
or only one of the negligence claims. '398
In Taherzadeh v. Ghaleh-Assadi,399 an action in which the mandatory
continuance language of Section 84.004(a) of the Texas Family Code 400
was at issue, the court followed well established case law holding that a
trial court's ruling on a motion for continuance is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard.40 1 Under this standard, "[a] trial court com-
mits an abuse of discretion if its decision is 'so arbitrary and unreasonable
as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law." 40 2
In Walker v. Gutierrez,40 3 the Texas Supreme Court addressed for the
first time the issue of the standard of review applicable to a trial court's
ruling on a grace period for the untimely filing of an expert report under
Section 13.01(g) of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
393. Id.
394. Id. at 367 (citing City of El Paso v. Public Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex.
1994)).
395. Id. (citing Stratton, 8 S.W.3d at 30).
396. Sedillo v. Valtierra, 115 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
397. Id. at 53 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 198.3 (matter admitted under Rule 198 is conclu-
sively established as to the party making the admission)); Flores v. H.E. Butt Stores, Inc.,
791 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
398. Id.
399. Taherzadeh v. Ghaleh-Assadi, 108 S.W.3d 927 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet.
denied).
400. Section 84.004(a) states "[i]f a respondent receives service of notice of an applica-
tion for a protective order within 48 hours before the time set for the hearing, on request
by the respondent, the court shall reschedule the hearing for a date not later than 14 days
after the date set for the hearing." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 84.004(a) (Vernon 2002).
401. Taherzadeh, 108 S.W.3d at 928 (citing BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83
S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002)).
402. Id.
403. Walker v. Guiterrez, 111 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. 2003).
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Act, 40 4 holding that review is under an abuse of discretion standard. 40 5
In King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman,40 6 the Texas Supreme Court reiter-
ated the standards of review for no-evidence summary judgment motions.
The supreme court noted that, because a no-evidence summary judgment
is "essentially a pretrial directed verdict," 40 7 the reviewing court applies
the same legal sufficiency standard as would be applied in reviewing a
directed verdict at trial.408 Under this standard, the court must "review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, disregarding
all contrary evidence and inferences. ' 40 9 The supreme court further
noted that a no-evidence point will be sustained on appeal when
(a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the
court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to
the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence of-
fered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the
evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.410
As a result, a no-evidence summary judgment is improperly granted "if
the respondent brings forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to
raise a genuine issue of material fact."' 411 As for the definition of "scin-
tilla," the court stated that less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the
evidence is "so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or
suspicion" of a fact. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the
evidence "rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded
people to differ in their conclusions. '412
In Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson,413 a products liability action,
the Texas Supreme Court announced a byzantine new factual sufficiency
standard of review applicable to review of jury awards of multiple dam-
age amounts in multiple damage categories. The supreme court stated
that "[t]he standard of review to determine factual sufficiency of the evi-
dence that we set forth today differs from the standard of review that is
applied when the jury is asked to award a single amount of damages, but
is told that it may consider various elements in arriving at that
amount. "414
404. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. art. 4590i, § 13.01(g), repealed effective September 1, 2003
and now codified as Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004), pro-
vided that a claimant is entitled to a grace period for the filing of an expert report only if
"after hearing, the court finds that the failure of the claimant or the claimant's attorney
was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was the result of an accident
or mistake." TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. art. 4590i, § 13.01(g).
405. Walker, 111 S.W.3d at 62.
406. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003).
407. Id. at 750.
408. Id. at 750-51.
409. Id. at 751 (citing Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.
1997)).
410. Id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., 953 S.W.2d at 711 (internal citations omitted)).
411. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d
502, 506 (Tex. 2002)).
412. Id.
413. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2003).
414. Id. at 771.
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In the situation in which the jury is asked to make a single award of
damages based on various elements, a factual sufficiency challenge "must
address all the elements that could have been considered by the jury in
making its total, single-amount award. '415 In this situation, the supreme
court stated, "[i]f there is just one element that is supported by the evi-
dence, the damages award will be affirmed if it is supported by the
evidence. '"416
By contrast, in Golden Eagle, the jury had six different categories of
damages to consider 4 17 and was instructed not to award damages for the
same element of damages more than once.4 18 In such a situation, the
Texas Supreme Court stated the factual sufficiency standard of review as
follows:
In conducting its factual sufficiency review, the court of appeals
should presume that the jury did not award damages to Jackson for
any element more than once, unless the record demonstrates other-
wise. Accordingly, in reviewing the evidence, the court of appeals
should consider whether the jury could reasonably have compen-
sated Jackson for a particular loss that might be "physical impair-
ment other than loss of vision" under another category of damages.
If the jury could have done so, then the failure to award damages for
that particular loss would not be against the great weight and pre-
ponderance of the evidence.4 19
The supreme court, noting that the plaintiff had challenged the factual
sufficiency of "the jury's failure to award larger damages in the categories
of physical pain and mental anguish, physical impairment of loss of vision,
and disfigurement, as well as the award of no damages for 'physical im-
pairment other than loss of vision," 4 20 stated:
The court of appeals should conduct a review of each of these cate-
gories, considering the evidence unique to each category. If, after
considering evidence unique to a category, the court concludes that
the jury's failure to award larger damages for that category is against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, it should then
consider all the overlapping evidence, together with the evidence
unique to each other category to determine if the total amount
awarded in the overlapping categories is factually sufficient. This
takes into account all the evidence regarding damages in categories
that overlap, but does not credit that evidence more than once in
evaluating the amount awarded by the jury.
415. Id. (citing Price v. Short, 931 S.W.2d 677, 688 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ)).
416. Id. (citing Greater Houston Transp., Inc. v. Zrubeck, 850 S.W.2d 579, 589 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied)).
417. The jury found liability and awarded damages to Mr. Jackson, the plaintiff, in five
separate categories: (1) medical care, (2) physical pain and mental anguish, (3) physical
impairment of loss of vision, (4) disfigurement, and (5) loss of earnings in the past. Id. at
760. In answer to a sixth category-physical impairment other than the loss of vision-the
jury awarded no damages. Id.
418. Id. at 771.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 773.
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The necessary corollary to these principles is that in reviewing a chal-
lenge that an award for a category is excessive because there is factually
insufficient evidence to support it, a court of appeals should consider all
the evidence that bears on that category of damages, even if the evidence
also relates to another category of damages. To do otherwise would
mean that evidence that reasonably could have supported the jury's
award would not be considered, which would be improper. If more than
one award in overlapping categories is challenged as excessive, the court
of appeals should consider all the evidence that relates to the total
amount awarded in all overlapping categories to determine if the total
amount awarded was excessive. This likewise gives full effect to all the
evidence without crediting any of the evidence more than once. 421
XI. APPELLATE REMEDIES
A. REMAND FOR HARMFUL CHARGE ERROR
An appellant is entitled to a remand for new trial based on error in the
jury charge where the error complained of probably prevented him from
properly presenting his case to the appellate courts.422 Expanding on its
application of this principle in Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel,423 the
Texas Supreme Court ruled in Harris County, Texas v. Smith424 that a
trial court's erroneous inclusion in the jury charge of an invalid element
of damage is harmful error, requiring a remand of the case. The court
reasoned that, as with an invalid liability theory (Casteel), an unsupported
element of damage prevents the appellant from demonstrating the conse-
quences of the error on appeal.425 A litigant has a right to a fair trial
before a jury properly instructed on the issues authorized and supported
by the law governing the case. Where it is not possible for the appellate
court to say the jury did not consider the erroneous charge in arriving at
the amount of damage, harm is presumed.426 Accordingly, when the trial
court includes, over timely and specific objection, both valid and invalid
elements of damages in a single broad-form submission, harm is inherent
in the error and the litigant's remedy on appeal is a remand for a new
trial.427
A litigant is also entitled to a remand for a new trial based on error in
the jury charge where the error probably caused the rendition of an im-
421. Id. at 773-74.
422. TEX. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(2), 61.1(b).
423. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 2 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000).
424. Harris County, Tex. v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2002).
425. Id. at 233.
426. Id. at 233-34.
427. Id. at 231. Responding to the dissents' assertions that the majority's conclusion
would result in the end of broad-form submission, the court pointed out that the comments
to the Texas Pattern Jury Charges have long recommended that damage elements should
be submitted separately "if there is substantial doubt as to whether there is evidence to
support" an element. Id. at 235 (quoting PJC 8.2 cmt. ("The use of a separate answer line
for each element of damages might avoid the need for a new trial if the appellate court
finds that one or more, but not all, of the elements lack legal or evidentiary support.")).
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proper judgment.428 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson,429 for example,
the Texas Supreme Court examined a trial court's submission of a spolia-
tion instruction to the jury. Finding the submission erroneous, the su-
preme court reversed and remanded the case, emphasizing that the court
does not lightly reverse a judgment because of an erroneous instruction.
The supreme court reasoned, however, that an "unnecessary spoliation
instruction is particularly likely to cause harm," because the instruction's
very purpose "is to 'nudge' or 'tilt' the jury." If a spoliation instruction
should not have been given, the supreme court concluded, "the likelihood
of harm from the erroneous instruction is substantial, particularly when
the case is closely contested. '430
B. REMAND "IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE"
In what appears to be an expansion of the situations in which a remand
"in the interest of justice" is appropriate under Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 43.3(b), the Eastland Court of Appeals in Archer Daniels Mid-
land Co. v. Bohall, a wrongful death case, ordered a remand of the case
for new trial based on error in the conditioning of questions in the jury
charge, despite the absence of any timely objection to the error.431 The
charge error in that case occurred when the trial court failed to properly
condition questions relating to the defendant's alleged negligence on a
"yes"-instead of a "no"-answer to a question about the defendant's
control over the manner in which the decedent performed work. It was
not until after the jury was discharged that the plaintiffs noticed and ob-
jected to the improper conditioning of the questions in the charge. As a
result of the charge error, the jury found that the proof was insufficient to
establish that the defendant had exercised control over the decedent, but
that the defendant had nonetheless committed negligence. 432
Although acknowledging that, despite the improper conditioning, a
judgment could be rendered in favor of the defendant based on the jury's
verdict by viewing the negligence findings as immaterial (due to the ab-
sence of liability under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section
95.003(1)), the court of appeals nonetheless remanded the case for a new
trial "in the interest of justice. '433 The court recognized the absence of
428. TEx. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1), 61.1(a).
429. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. 2003).
430. Id. at 724.
431. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Bohall, 114 S.W.3d 42, 47-48 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2003, no pet.).
432. The error in the charge was noticed by the parties immediately after the trial court
verbally discharged the jury, but before the jury left the courtroom. Since the jury was still
present, the trial court reassembled them to deliberate upon a corrected jury charge. The
only change in the corrected charge was the conditioning of the negligence questions on a
"yes" answer to the control question. Interestingly, in their second deliberation, the jurors
changed their answer to the control question (they had answered "no" the first time and
answered "yes" the second time). Id. at 44-45. The trial court based its judgment upon the
second, corrected jury charge. The court of appeals, however, concluded that the trial
court erred by reassembling the jury to deliberate upon the second charge. Id. at 47.
433. Id. at 48.
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any timely objection to the charge, but decided to remand because of the
unusual circumstances of the case and the "overall principle of justice"
conveyed by the Texas Supreme Court in Harris County v. Smith-"a
litigant in a jury trial has every right to a trial in which the jury has been
instructed correctly upon the law and the issues. 434
C. ABATEMENT FOR FAILURE TO FILE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A trial court has a mandatory duty to file findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law when properly requested under Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 297. The court's failure to do so is presumed to be harmful and, on
appeal, the usual remedy is to abate the appeal for entry of findings and
conclusions. 435 The test for harm, however, depends on the circum-
stances of the case and turns on whether the appellant would have to
guess the reasons for the trial court's ruling. Where the reasons for the
court's ruling are clear from the record and there is no disputed fact issue
for the court's resolution, there is no harm and the court of appeals may
render the judgment that should have been rendered by the trial court.436
D. RECUSAL OF APPELLATE COURT JUSTICES
Recusal of appellate court justices and judges is governed by Rule 16 of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which incorporates by reference
the grounds for recusal of trial court judges (Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 18b). 4 3 7 Rule 18b requires that a motion for recusal be verified,
made on personal knowledge and set forth such facts as would be admis-
sible in evidence or on information and belief if the grounds for such
belief are specifically stated.438 In Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, an appeal from
a turnover order, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals noted that neither the
appellate rules nor case law definitively state whether the requirement of
verification applies to motions in the appellate courts.439 The court none-
theless considered the unverified motion of the appellants seeking recusal
of the justices of the court and a transfer of the case.
In ruling on the motion to recuse and transfer, each challenged justice
considered the motion in chambers, and two recused themselves because
of prior participation in related proceedings in the trial court. 440 The re-
maining justices found no reason to recuse themselves, rejecting the ap-
434. Id. at 47 (citing Smith, 96 S.W.3d at 230).
435. Lubbock County Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Contrarez, 102 S.W.3d 424, 426 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.).
436. Id. See TEX. R. App. P. 43.2(c).
437. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 16.2 provides:
The grounds for recusal for an appellate court justice or judge are the same as those pro-
vided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, a justice or judge must recuse in a
proceeding if it presents a material issue which the justice or judge participated in deciding
while serving on another court in which the proceeding was pending. TEX. R. Civ. P. 16.2.
438. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(b).
439. Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, No. 2-03-054-CV, 2003 WL 21525417, *1 n.1 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth July 3, 2003, no pet.).
440. Id. at *2.
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pellants' contention that an appearance of impropriety would arise
because two of the justices had been named as defendants in federal law-
suits filed by appellants or that recusal was proper because the justices
had a "financial interest" in the portion of the turnover order that would
benefit the State of Texas. 441 The justices also found no merit in appel-
lants' argument that the court had a bias against appellant "as shown by
prior rulings by [the] court adverse to [a]ppellants. ' ' 442 Acknowledging
that the question of recusal is a case-by-case, fact-intensive analysis, the
court decided the motion with respect to each of the challenged justices
by a vote of the other remaining justices sitting en banc, in accordance
with Rule 16.3(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and found no
reason to recuse the justice under consideration.443
E. SUSPENSION OF RULES GOVERNING PLEADING PRACTICE IN
TRIAL COURT
Rule 2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure gives the courts of
appeals the power to suspend "a rule's operation in a particular case and
order a different procedure. '444 During the Survey period, the Texas Su-
preme Court clarified that this rule does not allow the courts of appeals to
suspend rules governing pleading practice before the trial courts.
445
XII. MOOT APPEALS
Subject to some exceptions, "a case becomes moot when a court's ac-
tions cannot affect the rights of the parties. ' 44 6 Applying this principle in
Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Read, the Texas Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals' refusal to reach the merits of a trial court's dismissal
of an easement condemnation proceeding in light of a pending second
condemnation proceeding filed by the same condemnor. The court of
appeals had concluded that the filing of the second condemnation pro-
ceeding before the first one was resolved mooted the question of whether
the condemnor was entitled to possession of the easements in the first
condemnation proceeding, despite the fact that the property owners had
obtained a judgment for wrongful condemnation in the first proceed-
ing.447 The supreme court disagreed that the appeal was moot, reasoning
that, if the trial court erred in dismissing the first proceeding, then the
condemnor's possession of the easements was legal and he would not owe
the property owners damages for wrongful condemnation. Accordingly,
441. Id. at *1.
442. Id.
443. Id. at *2.
444. TEX. R. App. P. 2.
445. Ray Ins. Agency v. Jones, 92 S.W.3d 530, 531 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam). The court
of appeals in Ray had purported to suspend, pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 2, the operation of
Rule 94 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, in connection with an argument that the
plaintiff had failed to plead estoppel.
446. Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Read, 104 S.W.3d 544, 545 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam).
447. Id.
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because the appellate court's action in either affirming or reversing the
trial court's dismissal of the first condemnation proceeding would affect
substantial rights of the parties, there was a live issue in controversy and
the appeal was not moot.448
Under certain circumstances, a nonsuit by a plaintiff can moot a pend-
ing appeal. For example, in Le v. Kilpatrick, the Tyler Court of Appeals
dismissed as moot an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of
defendants' special appearances after the plaintiffs nonsuited their claims
against the defendants.449 In concluding that the nonsuit mooted the ap-
peal, the court of appeals applied the general rule that a nonsuit vitiates
prior interlocutory orders. In doing so, the court recognized that excep-
tions exist as to this general rule as it relates to venue determinations and
rulings on the merits, but determined that a ruling on a special appear-
ance falls into the general rule and not the exception.450
XIII. APPELLATE COURT GUIDANCE ON IMPORTANT
ISSUES OF LAW
Several dissenting opinions issued during the Survey period reflect a
growing concern-at both the intermediate and supreme court levels-
about the lack of guidance by the courts on important issues of law. For
example, in Global Drywall Systems, Inc. v. Coronado Paint Co., three
supreme court justices dissented to the court's denial of the petition as
improvidently granted because, according to the dissenters, the court of
appeals's decision incorrectly changed the law regarding the assignability
of claims and the supreme court's denial of the petition "effectively
[leaves] this type of assignment void without an explanation. '451 Simi-
larly, in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Smith, one justice
from the Fourteenth District Houston Court of Appeals dissented to the
court's decision to withdraw its opinion pursuant to a request from the
parties after settlement because, according to the dissent, the dissenting
and concurring opinions in the case would have challenged the litigants'
improper use of a prior Fourteenth District Court of Appeals decision to
create a mass tort. 452 The dissent charged the court with doing a "disser-
vice to the public and the law by exercising its discretion to withdraw the
decisions in [the] case."'453
448. Id. at 545-46.
449. Le v. Kilpatrick, 112 S.W.3d 631, 633 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.).
450. Id. at 633-34.
451. Global Drywall Sys., Inc. v. Coronado Paint Co., 104 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. 2003).
452. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Smith, 93 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing Tamez v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London, 999 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)).
453. Id. at 659.
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